LLMs rely on semantic cues for matrix-game equilibria but can acquire approximate computation via residual training on small instances, with a Lipschitz proof enabling transfer to larger anonymous games.
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Equilibrium Residuals Expose Three Regimes of Matrix-Game Strategic Reasoning in Language Models
LLMs rely on semantic cues for matrix-game equilibria but can acquire approximate computation via residual training on small instances, with a Lipschitz proof enabling transfer to larger anonymous games.