Context-ordinal Nash equilibria are defined via social choice aggregation of ordinal preferences, shown to exist under mild conditions, with regularization, approximation, regret notions, complexity results, and learning rules developed.
Gender and Willingness to Lead: Does the Gender Composition of Teams Matter?The Review of Economics and Statistics, 104(2): 259–275, 03 2022
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Natural experiment from German reunification shows labor demand shock disperses hire quality and fails to boost female hires, converging to West German patterns, with simulations indicating higher quality for marginal female hires.
citing papers explorer
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Nash without Numbers: A Social Choice Approach to Mixed Equilibria in Context-Ordinal Games
Context-ordinal Nash equilibria are defined via social choice aggregation of ordinal preferences, shown to exist under mild conditions, with regularization, approximation, regret notions, complexity results, and learning rules developed.
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A missed opportunity? Labor demand and workforce diversity
Natural experiment from German reunification shows labor demand shock disperses hire quality and fails to boost female hires, converging to West German patterns, with simulations indicating higher quality for marginal female hires.