Designs optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms for buyer utility and welfare objectives in budget-feasible procurement, including prior-free constant-factor approximations for welfare and Bayesian near-optimal mechanisms for utility.
Online mechanism design with predictions
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
2
Pith papers citing it
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cs.GT 2verdicts
UNVERDICTED 2representative citing papers
Introduces mechanisms using weakest types and side information for bicriteria welfare-revenue guarantees that compete with total social surplus when side information is accurate.
citing papers explorer
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From Welfare to Utility: Generalized Objectives in Budget-Feasible Procurement
Designs optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms for buyer utility and welfare objectives in budget-feasible procurement, including prior-free constant-factor approximations for welfare and Bayesian near-optimal mechanisms for utility.
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Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information
Introduces mechanisms using weakest types and side information for bicriteria welfare-revenue guarantees that compete with total social surplus when side information is accurate.