A theoretical attacker-defender game in LLM adversarial prompting yields a best-response attack related to existing methods, reveals attacker advantages at equilibrium, and derives a provably optimal defense with stronger empirical performance.
arXiv preprint arXiv:2511.15304 , year=
4 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Automation-Exploit is a multi-agent LLM system that uses conditional digital-twin validation to perform risk-mitigated exploitation of logical, web, and memory-corruption vulnerabilities in black-box targets.
Stylistic rewrites of harmful prompts raise attack success rates from 3.84% to 36.8-65% across 31 frontier models, indicating weak generalization in safety refusals.
Poetic jailbreaks succeed because they induce distinct attention patterns in LLMs that are independent of harmful-content detection, not because models fail to recognize literary formatting.
citing papers explorer
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A Theoretical Game of Attacks via Compositional Skills
A theoretical attacker-defender game in LLM adversarial prompting yields a best-response attack related to existing methods, reveals attacker advantages at equilibrium, and derives a provably optimal defense with stronger empirical performance.
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Automation-Exploit: A Multi-Agent LLM Framework for Adaptive Offensive Security with Digital Twin-Based Risk-Mitigated Exploitation
Automation-Exploit is a multi-agent LLM system that uses conditional digital-twin validation to perform risk-mitigated exploitation of logical, web, and memory-corruption vulnerabilities in black-box targets.
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Adversarial Humanities Benchmark: Results on Stylistic Robustness in Frontier Model Safety
Stylistic rewrites of harmful prompts raise attack success rates from 3.84% to 36.8-65% across 31 frontier models, indicating weak generalization in safety refusals.
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Metaphor Is Not All Attention Needs
Poetic jailbreaks succeed because they induce distinct attention patterns in LLMs that are independent of harmful-content detection, not because models fail to recognize literary formatting.