In the seller-first timing model, deterministic seller mechanisms reduce to posted prices while the intermediary best-responds with a shifted Myerson auction, yielding arbitrarily poor seller revenue for regular distributions but constant-factor recovery for alpha-strongly regular ones, with timing,
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A queueing model derives stability conditions for LLM inference services under combined compute and KV cache memory limits, with experimental validation showing typical deviations under 10%.
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Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary
In the seller-first timing model, deterministic seller mechanisms reduce to posted prices while the intermediary best-responds with a shifted Myerson auction, yielding arbitrarily poor seller revenue for regular distributions but constant-factor recovery for alpha-strongly regular ones, with timing,
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A Queueing-Theoretic Framework for Stability Analysis of LLM Inference with KV Cache Memory Constraints
A queueing model derives stability conditions for LLM inference services under combined compute and KV cache memory limits, with experimental validation showing typical deviations under 10%.