Introduces asymmetric (b_t, s_t) price tuples for trading prophets and gives online algorithms achieving constant competitive ratios for unit capacity and 1 - Θ(log B0/√B0) for general capacity under i.i.d. arrivals.
Hartline, and Robert Kleinberg
4 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
4
Pith papers citing it
years
2026 4verdicts
UNVERDICTED 4representative citing papers
Uniform-Ironed-Virtual-Value Item Pricing achieves a tight 3-approximation to the Duality Relaxation Benchmark in unit-demand single-buyer revenue maximization.
Simple mechanisms achieve arbitrary approximation to optimal revenue for bounded-support distributions with private budgets but cannot guarantee any positive fraction of optimal revenue for unbounded supports or certain bounded distributions, even under independence.
Polynomial samples learn dual pricing and polynomial queries learn near-optimal anonymous pricing for online resource allocation with heterogeneous agents.
citing papers explorer
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Asymmetric Trading Prophets
Introduces asymmetric (b_t, s_t) price tuples for trading prophets and gives online algorithms achieving constant competitive ratios for unit capacity and 1 - Θ(log B0/√B0) for general capacity under i.i.d. arrivals.
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Benchmark-Tight Approximation Ratio of Simple Mechanism for a Unit-Demand Buyer
Uniform-Ironed-Virtual-Value Item Pricing achieves a tight 3-approximation to the Duality Relaxation Benchmark in unit-demand single-buyer revenue maximization.
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Evaluating the Performance of Approximation Mechanisms under Budget Constraints
Simple mechanisms achieve arbitrary approximation to optimal revenue for bounded-support distributions with private budgets but cannot guarantee any positive fraction of optimal revenue for unbounded supports or certain bounded distributions, even under independence.
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Learning Anonymous Pricing for Online Resource Allocation
Polynomial samples learn dual pricing and polynomial queries learn near-optimal anonymous pricing for online resource allocation with heterogeneous agents.