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arxiv: 2606.28058 · v1 · pith:7UE7MOCLnew · submitted 2026-06-26 · 💻 cs.SE

SBridge: Identifying Source-to-Binary Function Similarity via Cross-Domain Control Block Matching

Pith reviewed 2026-06-29 03:37 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.SE
keywords source-to-binary matchingfunction similaritycontrol blocksbinary analysiscode reuse detectionvulnerability propagationstripped binariesfunction inlining
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The pith

SBridge segments functions into control blocks to match source code to binaries despite inlining and stripping.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper introduces SBridge to identify which binary functions correspond to given source functions by dividing both into control blocks such as conditionals and loops. This segmentation creates a shared representation that survives compilation changes like inlining, where roughly 40 percent of functions disappear into callers. Existing methods using string literals or whole-function structures produce many mismatches; the control-block approach measures similarity at a finer grain. A reader would care because source code is easier to obtain and analyze than binaries, making vulnerability tracking in deployed software more feasible. The evaluation on thousands of real C/C++ binaries shows the method recovers the correct binary function for most source inputs.

Core claim

SBridge treats control blocks as the cross-domain unit for similarity measurement, allowing functions to be compared even when inlining merges them or when binaries lack symbols.

What carries the argument

Control block segmentation, which breaks functions into conditionals, loops and similar structures to serve as the matching representation between source and binary domains.

If this is right

  • Reused vulnerable code can be located in binaries by direct reference to the original source rather than compiled artifacts.
  • Detection remains possible on stripped binaries that lack debug information or symbol tables.
  • Fewer false matches occur compared with methods that compare entire functions or rely on embedded strings.
  • The same block-level representation supports ranking multiple candidate binaries for a single source function.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The same block segmentation might be tested on languages beyond C/C++ to check whether control-flow units transfer across different compiler pipelines.
  • If control blocks prove stable, the method could be applied to partial binaries or to code that has undergone heavy optimization passes not covered in the current evaluation.
  • Control-block matching could be combined with data-flow features to handle cases where control structure is altered but behavior is preserved.

Load-bearing premise

Segmenting functions into control blocks yields units that remain identifiable and comparable after compilation even when many functions are inlined.

What would settle it

A collection of source-binary pairs in which control-block sequences differ substantially after compilation yet the functions perform identical work, or pairs in which blocks match but the functions are unrelated.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2606.28058 by Hajin Yun, Heedong Yang, Jeongwoo Lee, Seunghoon Woo.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Three major challenges in matching source code and binaries. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: Overview of SBridge. Scope and assumption. SBridge operates regardless of whether the binary is stripped. Because of function inlining, a single source function may correspond to multiple binary functions (1-to-N matching), and conversely, multiple source functions may map to a single binary function (N-to-1 matching). Instead of identifying only the most similar binary function for a given source function… view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Flow of internal branching block vector extraction and similarity comparison for the example code. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Recall@1 measurement results by architecture, compiler, optimization, and symbol management. 0.22 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.78 0.83 0.79 0.84 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Recall @ 5 ARM32 ARM64 x86 x64 (a) By architecture. 0.29 0.27 0.51 0.49 0.81 0.81 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Recall @ 5 GCC Clang (b) By compiler. 0.36 0.20 0.59 0.41 0.88 0.74 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Recall @ 5 -O0 -O2 (c) By optimization. 0.85 0… view at source ↗
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: Recall@5 measurement results by architecture, compiler, optimization, and symbol management. is used to evaluate how highly the correct results are ranked for a given query. In our setting, the query is an input source function, and the correct result is its corresponding binary function. Result overview. Experimental results show that SBridge outperforms both the MRT-OAST and BinaryAI across most configur… view at source ↗
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Threshold experiment and performance evaluation results. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p015_7.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

We present SBridge, a precise approach for identifying functions in binaries that are similar to the given source code functions. Identifying reused code in binaries is critical for security, particularly for detecting propagated vulnerabilities. Although binary-to-binary comparison is feasible, leveraging source code as the reference is more practical because source code is easier to collect and analyze directly without compilation. However, significant gaps between source and binary representations, including function inlining, create challenges in cross-domain function detection. Existing approaches primarily rely on string literals or structural similarities between entire functions, failing to capture detailed code behavior and generating many false alarms. SBridge addresses these limitations through a key innovation: control block-based function matching, which encapsulates essential functional features by segmenting functions into meaningful units such as conditionals and loops. Leveraging control blocks as a cross-domain representation, SBridge enables precise measurement of function similarity between source and binary code, effectively overcoming challenges posed by function inlining and stripped binaries. For evaluation, we collected 3,904 real-world C/C++ binaries from BinKit. In experiments identifying binary functions identical to input source functions, despite approximately 40% of binary functions being inlined, SBridge achieved 75.13% recall@1 and 80.98% recall@5, outperforming existing approaches, which achieved up to 43.31% recall@1 and 50.2% recall@

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 1 minor

Summary. The paper presents SBridge, a technique for source-to-binary function similarity detection that segments functions into control blocks (conditionals, loops) as a cross-domain representation. It claims this overcomes function inlining (~40% of functions) and stripping, evaluated on 3,904 real-world C/C++ binaries from BinKit, achieving 75.13% recall@1 and 80.98% recall@5 while outperforming baselines (up to 43.31% recall@1).

Significance. If the control-block matching is shown to preserve correspondence under inlining, the work could meaningfully advance practical binary vulnerability detection by enabling direct use of source references. The scale of the BinKit evaluation is a positive factor, but the absence of verifiable methodology details limits assessment of whether the reported gains are robust.

major comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] Abstract: the central claim that 'control block-based function matching... effectively overcoming challenges posed by function inlining' is load-bearing for the recall numbers, yet the text supplies no description of binary CFG block extraction, no mechanism for merged or flattened blocks after inlining, and no partial-match or alignment logic. Inlining changes block count and nesting, so the representation's robustness is asserted without supporting detail or evidence.
  2. [Abstract] Abstract: the reported recall@1 (75.13%) and recall@5 (80.98%) are presented without methodology, baseline definitions, data exclusion rules, error bars, or statistical tests, rendering the performance claims unverifiable from the given text and undermining the comparison to the 43.31% baseline.
minor comments (1)
  1. [Abstract] Abstract: the final sentence is truncated ('50.2% recall@').

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the constructive feedback on our manuscript. We address each major comment point by point below, providing clarifications from the full paper and indicating where revisions to the abstract will strengthen the presentation.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the central claim that 'control block-based function matching... effectively overcoming challenges posed by function inlining' is load-bearing for the recall numbers, yet the text supplies no description of binary CFG block extraction, no mechanism for merged or flattened blocks after inlining, and no partial-match or alignment logic. Inlining changes block count and nesting, so the representation's robustness is asserted without supporting detail or evidence.

    Authors: The abstract summarizes the key innovation at a high level, as is conventional. The full manuscript provides the requested details: binary CFG block extraction is described in Section 3.1 (parsing source ASTs and binary disassembly to identify control blocks for conditionals/loops), while the handling of merged/flattened blocks and changes in nesting/count due to inlining is addressed via the cross-domain alignment algorithm in Section 3.3, which performs partial sequence matching on control block features to tolerate inlining (noted as affecting ~40% of functions). We will revise the abstract to briefly note the use of alignment-based partial matching for robustness under inlining. revision: partial

  2. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the reported recall@1 (75.13%) and recall@5 (80.98%) are presented without methodology, baseline definitions, data exclusion rules, error bars, or statistical tests, rendering the performance claims unverifiable from the given text and undermining the comparison to the 43.31% baseline.

    Authors: The metrics are the primary results from the evaluation on the 3,904 BinKit binaries (detailed in Section 5), with baselines explicitly compared (the 43.31% recall@1 from the strongest prior method), data processing rules (including inlined/stripped functions), and experimental protocol described in that section. The abstract reports headline figures due to length limits. We will revise the abstract to reference the evaluation dataset scale, inlining rate, and baseline comparisons more explicitly; error bars and statistical tests can be incorporated if space allows in a revised version. revision: partial

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity in derivation chain

full rationale

The paper describes an empirical method for cross-domain function similarity detection via control-block segmentation and reports recall metrics from evaluation on the BinKit dataset. No equations, first-principles derivations, fitted parameters presented as predictions, or self-citation chains appear in the abstract or description. The central claim is justified by experimental results rather than by construction or tautological reduction to inputs.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 0 axioms · 0 invented entities

Abstract-only input provides no equations, parameters, or modeling details; no free parameters, axioms, or invented entities can be identified.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.1-grok · 5791 in / 1066 out tokens · 38386 ms · 2026-06-29T03:37:49.611257+00:00 · methodology

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Reference graph

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