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arxiv: math/0507013 · v2 · submitted 2005-07-01 · 🧮 math.OC

The Nash-Equilibrium Requires Strong Cooperation

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keywords cooperationassumptionnash-equilibriumstrongcelebratedcontrarycustomaryessentially
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Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption. Furthermore, in practice, this cooperation assumption is simply unrealistic.

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