Device-independent security of quantum cryptography against collective attacks
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We present the optimal collective attack on a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol in the "device-independent" security scenario, where no assumptions are made about the way the QKD devices work or on what quantum system they operate. Our main result is a tight bound on the Holevo information between one of the authorized parties and the eavesdropper, as a function of the amount of violation of a Bell-type inequality.
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