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Rethinking the Trigger of Backdoor Attack

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arxiv 2004.04692 v3 pith:5KLNFVI2 submitted 2020-04-09 cs.CR cs.CVcs.LG

classification cs.CRcs.CVcs.LG
keywords backdoortriggerattackattacksexistinghiddenimagesparadigm
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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abstract

Backdoor attack intends to inject hidden backdoor into the deep neural networks (DNNs), such that the prediction of the infected model will be maliciously changed if the hidden backdoor is activated by the attacker-defined trigger, while it performs well on benign samples. Currently, most of existing backdoor attacks adopted the setting of \emph{static} trigger, $i.e.,$ triggers across the training and testing images follow the same appearance and are located in the same area. In this paper, we revisit this attack paradigm by analyzing the characteristics of the static trigger. We demonstrate that such an attack paradigm is vulnerable when the trigger in testing images is not consistent with the one used for training. We further explore how to utilize this property for backdoor defense, and discuss how to alleviate such vulnerability of existing attacks.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Breaking the Stealth-Potency Trade-off in Clean-Image Backdoors with Generative Trigger Optimization

    cs.CV 2025-11 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    GCB uses a class-conditioned InfoGAN to select naturally occurring image features as clean-image backdoor triggers, achieving over 90% attack success with under 1% clean accuracy drop at poison rates around 0.5%.

  2. Bridging Distribution Shift and AI Safety: Conceptual and Methodological Synergies

    cs.LG 2025-05 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    The paper proposes a one-to-one mapping between six causes of distribution shift and several AI safety issues, arguing for mutual method transfer through aligned definitions.

  3. A Survey of Safety on Large Vision-Language Models: Attacks, Defenses and Evaluations

    cs.CR 2025-02 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A survey of LVLM safety that adds a lifecycle taxonomy and new benchmark results showing Janus-Pro-7B has weaker safety than several open-source LVLMs.

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