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Numerical Methods for Mean Field Games and Mean Field Type Control

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arxiv 2106.06231 v1 pith:AO25F7FM submitted 2021-06-11 math.OC cs.NAmath.NA

classification math.OCcs.NAmath.NA
keywords fieldmeanmethodsnumericalproblemscontrolgamesplayers
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Mean Field Games (MFG) have been introduced to tackle games with a large number of competing players. Considering the limit when the number of players is infinite, Nash equilibria are studied by considering the interaction of a typical player with the population's distribution. The situation in which the players cooperate corresponds to Mean Field Control (MFC) problems, which can also be viewed as optimal control problems driven by a McKean-Vlasov dynamics. These two types of problems have found a wide range of potential applications, for which numerical methods play a key role since most models do not have analytical solutions. In these notes, we review several aspects of numerical methods for MFG and MFC. We start by presenting some heuristics in a basic linear-quadratic setting. We then discuss numerical schemes for forward-backward systems of partial differential equations (PDEs), optimization techniques for variational problems driven by a Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck PDE, an approach based on a monotone operator viewpoint, and stochastic methods relying on machine learning tools.

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  1. Iterative Schemes for Markov Perfect Equilibria

    math.OC 2025-07 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Picard and weighted Picard best-response iterations converge geometrically to the unique Markov perfect equilibrium in symmetric finite-state continuous-time games, with no Lasry-Lions monotonicity needed.

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