Pith. sign in

REVIEW 2 cited by

Differentially Private Label Protection in Split Learning

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2203.02073 v1 pith:ALZZAVGF submitted 2022-03-04 cs.LG cs.CRcs.DS

classification cs.LGcs.CRcs.DS
keywords learningsplitprivateprivacytextsftpslcomputationdata
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

Split learning is a distributed training framework that allows multiple parties to jointly train a machine learning model over vertically partitioned data (partitioned by attributes). The idea is that only intermediate computation results, rather than private features and labels, are shared between parties so that raw training data remains private. Nevertheless, recent works showed that the plaintext implementation of split learning suffers from severe privacy risks that a semi-honest adversary can easily reconstruct labels. In this work, we propose \textsf{TPSL} (Transcript Private Split Learning), a generic gradient perturbation based split learning framework that provides provable differential privacy guarantee. Differential privacy is enforced on not only the model weights, but also the communicated messages in the distributed computation setting. Our experiments on large-scale real-world datasets demonstrate the robustness and effectiveness of \textsf{TPSL} against label leakage attacks. We also find that \textsf{TPSL} have a better utility-privacy trade-off than baselines.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. SafeSplit: A Novel Defense Against Client-Side Backdoor Attacks in Split Learning (Full Version)

    cs.CR 2025-01 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    SafeSplit detects poisoned client updates in U-shaped split learning by comparing DCT frequency distances and rotational distances of backbone states, then rolling back to the latest benign checkpoint; experiments sho...

  2. Privacy Preserving Conversion Modeling in Data Clean Room

    cs.LG 2025-05 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    Batch-level aggregated gradients, LoRA adapters, and de-biased label differential privacy let advertisers and platforms train conversion models in a clean room with modest AUC loss and much lower communication cost.

Pith tools