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Incentivizing Federated Learning

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arxiv 2205.10951 v1 pith:LJQ4ZRPH submitted 2022-05-22 cs.GT cs.AIcs.LG

classification cs.GTcs.AIcs.LG
keywords datalearningclientsfederatedcontributeincentivemodelthey
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Federated Learning is an emerging distributed collaborative learning paradigm used by many of applications nowadays. The effectiveness of federated learning relies on clients' collective efforts and their willingness to contribute local data. However, due to privacy concerns and the costs of data collection and model training, clients may not always contribute all the data they possess, which would negatively affect the performance of the global model. This paper presents an incentive mechanism that encourages clients to contribute as much data as they can obtain. Unlike previous incentive mechanisms, our approach does not monetize data. Instead, we implicitly use model performance as a reward, i.e., significant contributors are paid off with better models. We theoretically prove that clients will use as much data as they can possibly possess to participate in federated learning under certain conditions with our incentive mechanism

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Compensation Design

    cs.GT 2026-07 accept novelty 8.0 of 10

    Under monotone submodular platform value and private agent costs, the marginal-contribution payment rule admits pure Nash equilibria and a tight price of anarchy of 2+o(1), while Shapley-value payments can have no pur...

  2. Strategic Incentivization for Locally Differentially Private Federated Learning

    cs.LG 2025-08 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A token system where tokens expire and global models cost tokens forces strategic federated learning clients to adopt the server's acceptable privacy level.

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