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Backdoor Learning on Sequence to Sequence Models
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Backdoor learning has become an emerging research area towards building a trustworthy machine learning system. While a lot of works have studied the hidden danger of backdoor attacks in image or text classification, there is a limited understanding of the model's robustness on backdoor attacks when the output space is infinite and discrete. In this paper, we study a much more challenging problem of testing whether sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Specifically, we find by only injecting 0.2\% samples of the dataset, we can cause the seq2seq model to generate the designated keyword and even the whole sentence. Furthermore, we utilize Byte Pair Encoding (BPE) to create multiple new triggers, which brings new challenges to backdoor detection since these backdoors are not static. Extensive experiments on machine translation and text summarization have been conducted to show our proposed methods could achieve over 90\% attack success rate on multiple datasets and models.
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Cited by 2 Pith papers
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