Pith. sign in

REVIEW 2 cited by

Backdoor Learning on Sequence to Sequence Models

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2305.02424 v1 pith:L2SV2DK7 submitted 2023-05-03 cs.CL

classification cs.CL
keywords backdoorattackslearningmodelsmachinemodelmultipleseq2seq
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

Signed reviews

No signed human review yet.

0 comments
read the original abstract

Backdoor learning has become an emerging research area towards building a trustworthy machine learning system. While a lot of works have studied the hidden danger of backdoor attacks in image or text classification, there is a limited understanding of the model's robustness on backdoor attacks when the output space is infinite and discrete. In this paper, we study a much more challenging problem of testing whether sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Specifically, we find by only injecting 0.2\% samples of the dataset, we can cause the seq2seq model to generate the designated keyword and even the whole sentence. Furthermore, we utilize Byte Pair Encoding (BPE) to create multiple new triggers, which brings new challenges to backdoor detection since these backdoors are not static. Extensive experiments on machine translation and text summarization have been conducted to show our proposed methods could achieve over 90\% attack success rate on multiple datasets and models.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Paladin: Defending LLM-enabled Phishing Emails with a New Trigger-Tag Paradigm

    cs.CR 2025-09 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    A trigger-tag watermark embedded by fine-tuning lets modified LLMs mark their own phishing outputs for cheap detection.

  2. Task-Agnostic Language Model Watermarking via High Entropy Passthrough Layers

    cs.CL 2024-12 reject novelty 6.0 of 10

    A backdoor watermark for LLMs using passthrough layers trained to output high-entropy text on a private key, with near-perfect extraction in benign settings but with layer-removal robustness contradicted by the paper'...

Pith tools