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VillanDiffusion: A Unified Backdoor Attack Framework for Diffusion Models
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Diffusion Models (DMs) are state-of-the-art generative models that learn a reversible corruption process from iterative noise addition and denoising. They are the backbone of many generative AI applications, such as text-to-image conditional generation. However, recent studies have shown that basic unconditional DMs (e.g., DDPM and DDIM) are vulnerable to backdoor injection, a type of output manipulation attack triggered by a maliciously embedded pattern at model input. This paper presents a unified backdoor attack framework (VillanDiffusion) to expand the current scope of backdoor analysis for DMs. Our framework covers mainstream unconditional and conditional DMs (denoising-based and score-based) and various training-free samplers for holistic evaluations. Experiments show that our unified framework facilitates the backdoor analysis of different DM configurations and provides new insights into caption-based backdoor attacks on DMs. Our code is available on GitHub: \url{https://github.com/IBM/villandiffusion}
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Cited by 1 Pith paper
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TrojFlow: Flow Models are Natural Targets for Trojan Attacks
TrojFlow fine-tunes a rectified-flow generator so specific trigger-noise inputs produce attacker-chosen images, keeps benign outputs usable, and qualitatively evades UFID and TERD defenses on CIFAR-10 and CelebA.
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