Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

As of 10 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 13 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2310.16048.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2310.16048 v1

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 13 of 13 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00

measured 13 of 13 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-09T20:51:59.168247Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-07-04T06:49:37.687647Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

verified exact0
verified fuzzy0
unresolved0
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 7f567e71-1b15-4cde-b285-492acbda56a6 · inbound

Jackpot! Alignment as a Maximal Lottery cites this paper.

Jackpot! Alignment as a Maximal Lottery AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 36

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-09T20:51:59.168247Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 5b6e277d-273c-4562-acb8-5b9936b9b6c1 · inbound

Game Theory Meets Large Language Models: A Systematic Survey with Taxonomy and New Frontiers cites this paper.

Game Theory Meets Large Language Models: A Systematic Survey with Taxonomy and New Frontiers AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 145

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T22:50:33.192151Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 471b2763-1d26-4eb3-bcd7-95d0ad7d6816 · inbound

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback cites this paper.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 218

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-22T19:32:01.355486Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

Observation 6e95837e-4e49-4d79-8aaf-81e2f52e68b2 · inbound

Fundamental Limits of Game-Theoretic LLM Alignment: Smith Consistency and Preference Matching cites this paper.

Fundamental Limits of Game-Theoretic LLM Alignment: Smith Consistency and Preference Matching AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 25

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T14:16:39.099771Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation eec2a541-f21b-427a-832c-569c9656b9d6 · inbound

Distortion of AI Alignment: Does Preference Optimization Optimize for Preferences? cites this paper.

Distortion of AI Alignment: Does Preference Optimization Optimize for Preferences? AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 35

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T12:49:08.964242Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation f056459f-c02d-4a49-91fb-13dadd438e7c · inbound

Theoretical Tensions in RLHF: Reconciling Empirical Success with Inconsistencies in Social Choice Theory cites this paper.

Theoretical Tensions in RLHF: Reconciling Empirical Success with Inconsistencies in Social Choice Theory AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 11

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T01:04:31.412637Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 85bc4ccd-7088-46ce-af3b-9a1c3d8539c0 · inbound

Quantitative Relaxations of Arrow's Axioms cites this paper.

Quantitative Relaxations of Arrow's Axioms AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 9

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T00:44:30.601050Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 0214a868-ef88-4346-9ea1-ef37c91f4d38 · inbound

MoralityGym: A Benchmark for Evaluating Hierarchical Moral Alignment in Sequential Decision-Making Agents cites this paper.

MoralityGym: A Benchmark for Evaluating Hierarchical Moral Alignment in Sequential Decision-Making Agents AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 66

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-22T10:51:25.957048Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

Observation ec057275-683f-4603-af67-69543d0ef6c1 · inbound

Power and Limitations of Aggregation in Compound AI Systems cites this paper.

Power and Limitations of Aggregation in Compound AI Systems AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 43

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-02T21:09:52.099062Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d2cd7178-0074-47f0-9c8d-7e6648b3abf2 · inbound

Fair Agents: Balancing Multistakeholder Alignment in Multi-Agent Personalization Systems cites this paper.

Fair Agents: Balancing Multistakeholder Alignment in Multi-Agent Personalization Systems AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 21

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-09T06:35:40.922275Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

Observation b9b693a1-97da-4ac4-8646-24ba2dbc92c1 · inbound

Curated Synthetic Data Doesn't Have to Collapse: A Theoretical Study of Generative Retraining with Pluralistic Preferences cites this paper.

Curated Synthetic Data Doesn't Have to Collapse: A Theoretical Study of Generative Retraining with Pluralistic Preferences AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 80

Resolution: metadata mismatch; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-11T02:30:54.525051Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

Observation 7c6fa55f-d198-4ea5-bffc-146bced945f0 · inbound

Variance-aware Reward Modeling with Anchor Guidance cites this paper.

Variance-aware Reward Modeling with Anchor Guidance AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 47

Resolution: metadata mismatch; arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-13T05:12:17.522388Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.

Observation 0e837716-cc11-4757-8379-fc1d4713c8f0 · inbound

AI Alignment From Social Choice Perspectives cites this paper.

AI Alignment From Social Choice Perspectives AI Alignment and Social Choice: Fundamental Limitations and Policy Implications

Reference 37

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-04T06:49:37.689346Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-10T06:31:04.303077+00:00.