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Hidden You Malicious Goal Into Benign Narratives: Jailbreak Large Language Models through Logic Chain Injection

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arxiv 2404.04849 v2 pith:LL7VEV3L submitted 2024-04-07 cs.CR cs.AI

classification cs.CRcs.AI
keywords deceiveattacksbenignhumanjailbreakllmsmaliciousinjection
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Jailbreak attacks on Language Model Models (LLMs) entail crafting prompts aimed at exploiting the models to generate malicious content. Existing jailbreak attacks can successfully deceive the LLMs, however they cannot deceive the human. This paper proposes a new type of jailbreak attacks which can deceive both the LLMs and human (i.e., security analyst). The key insight of our idea is borrowed from the social psychology - that is human are easily deceived if the lie is hidden in truth. Based on this insight, we proposed the logic-chain injection attacks to inject malicious intention into benign truth. Logic-chain injection attack firstly dissembles its malicious target into a chain of benign narrations, and then distribute narrations into a related benign article, with undoubted facts. In this way, newly generate prompt cannot only deceive the LLMs, but also deceive human.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Layer-Wise Perturbations via Sparse Autoencoders for Adversarial Text Generation

    cs.CL 2025-08 reject novelty 5.0 of 10

    Sparse autoencoder activation perturbation (SFPF) applied on top of existing jailbreak prompts raises attack success rate on Qwen3-32B, but with no defense evaluation and weak reproducibility.

  2. An Audit and Analysis of LLM-Assisted Health Misinformation Jailbreaks Against LLMs

    cs.CL 2025-08 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    LLM-generated jailbreak prompts elicited health misinformation from GPT-3.5, Llama 3.1-8B, and Gemini 2.0 Flash at high rates, and both LLM judges and simple classifiers detected the resulting texts with high accuracy.

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