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BEEAR: Embedding-based Adversarial Removal of Safety Backdoors in Instruction-tuned Language Models

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arxiv 2406.17092 v1 pith:JXI5SPIP submitted 2024-06-24 cs.CR cs.AI

classification cs.CRcs.AI
keywords behaviorsbeearsafetybackdoorbackdoorsmodelattacksembedding
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Safety backdoor attacks in large language models (LLMs) enable the stealthy triggering of unsafe behaviors while evading detection during normal interactions. The high dimensionality of potential triggers in the token space and the diverse range of malicious behaviors make this a critical challenge. We present BEEAR, a mitigation approach leveraging the insight that backdoor triggers induce relatively uniform drifts in the model's embedding space. Our bi-level optimization method identifies universal embedding perturbations that elicit unwanted behaviors and adjusts the model parameters to reinforce safe behaviors against these perturbations. Experiments show BEEAR reduces the success rate of RLHF time backdoor attacks from >95% to <1% and from 47% to 0% for instruction-tuning time backdoors targeting malicious code generation, without compromising model utility. Requiring only defender-defined safe and unwanted behaviors, BEEAR represents a step towards practical defenses against safety backdoors in LLMs, providing a foundation for further advancements in AI safety and security.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Paladin: Defending LLM-enabled Phishing Emails with a New Trigger-Tag Paradigm

    cs.CR 2025-09 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    A trigger-tag watermark embedded by fine-tuning lets modified LLMs mark their own phishing outputs for cheap detection.

  2. Lethe: Purifying Backdoored Large Language Models with Knowledge Dilution

    cs.CL 2025-08 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    LETHE uses parameter-level model merging plus prompt-level word definitions to dilute backdoor behavior in LLMs, cutting attack success to below 7% in most tested settings.

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