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Robust Restaking Networks
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We study the risks of validator reuse across multiple services in a restaking protocol. We characterize the robust security of a restaking network as a function of the buffer between the costs and profits from attacks. For example, our results imply that if attack costs always exceed attack profits by 10\%, then a sudden loss of .1\% of the overall stake (e.g., due to a software error) cannot result in the ultimate loss of more than 1.1\% of the overall stake. We also provide local analogs of these overcollateralization conditions and robust security guarantees that apply specifically for a target service or coalition of services. All of our bounds on worst-case stake loss are the best possible. Finally, we bound the maximum-possible length of a cascade of attacks. Our results suggest measures of robustness that could be exposed to the participants in a restaking protocol. We also suggest polynomial-time computable sufficient conditions that can proxy for these measures.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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Economic Security of Multiple Shared Security Protocols
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