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ConfusedPilot: Confused Deputy Risks in RAG-based LLMs

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arxiv 2408.04870 v5 pith:TZ6ZCWUW submitted 2024-08-09 cs.CR cs.AI

classification cs.CRcs.AI
keywords rag-basedsystemsresponsessecurityvulnerabilitiescauseconfusedpilotcopilot
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Retrieval augmented generation (RAG) is a process where a large language model (LLM) retrieves useful information from a database and then generates the responses. It is becoming popular in enterprise settings for daily business operations. For example, Copilot for Microsoft 365 has accumulated millions of businesses. However, the security implications of adopting such RAG-based systems are unclear. In this paper, we introduce ConfusedPilot, a class of security vulnerabilities of RAG systems that confuse Copilot and cause integrity and confidentiality violations in its responses. First, we investigate a vulnerability that embeds malicious text in the modified prompt in RAG, corrupting the responses generated by the LLM. Second, we demonstrate a vulnerability that leaks secret data, which leverages the caching mechanism during retrieval. Third, we investigate how both vulnerabilities can be exploited to propagate misinformation within the enterprise and ultimately impact its operations, such as sales and manufacturing. We also discuss the root cause of these attacks by investigating the architecture of a RAG-based system. This study highlights the security vulnerabilities in today's RAG-based systems and proposes design guidelines to secure future RAG-based systems.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

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    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    OS-level defenses against self-hosted AI agents that corrupt their own memory/config files can close most attack cells but cannot detect small in-distribution memory edits, leaving a residual surface.

  2. Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Generation

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    A unified benchmark evaluation finds that existing RAG poisoning attacks remain effective on standard QA datasets, drop on expanded knowledge bases, and are only partially mitigated by current defenses.

  3. Blockchain Empowered Trustworthy Agent Networks: Foundations, Taxonomy, and Future Directions

    cs.CR 2026-08 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A survey proposing a five-dimensional taxonomy of trust crises in open AI agent networks and analyzing blockchain's role as a shared trust infrastructure.

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