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Developers Are Victims Too : A Comprehensive Analysis of The VS Code Extension Ecosystem

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arxiv 2411.07479 v1 pith:T56COTWI submitted 2024-11-12 cs.CR cs.SE

classification cs.CRcs.SE
keywords codedevelopmentthird-partydeveloperextensionsproductsecuritysoftware
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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With the wave of high-profile supply chain attacks targeting development and client organizations, supply chain security has recently become a focal point. As a result, there is an elevated discussion on securing the development environment and increasing the transparency of the third-party code that runs in software products to minimize any negative impact from third-party code in a software product. However, the literature on secure software development lacks insight into how the third-party development tools used by every developer affect the security posture of the developer, the development organization, and, eventually, the end product. To that end, we have analyzed 52,880 third-party VS Code extensions to understand their threat to the developer, the code, and the development organizations. We found that ~5.6\% of the analyzed extensions have suspicious behavior, jeopardizing the integrity of the development environment and potentially leaking sensitive information on the developer's product. We also found that the VS Code hosting the third-party extensions lacks practical security controls and lets untrusted third-party code run unchecked and with questionable capabilities. We offer recommendations on possible avenues for fixing some of the issues uncovered during the analysis.

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  1. MalTotal: Cost-Effective and Language-Agnostic Malicious Code Poisoning Detection for Millions of Repositories

    cs.CR 2026-08 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    MalTotal combines LLM-based sensitive API discovery, code slicing, and LLM judgment to detect malicious repositories across five languages with an average F1 of 93.1% at low cost per scan.

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