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Best-of-N Jailbreaking

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arxiv 2412.03556 v2 pith:JC3GMNP5 submitted 2024-12-04 cs.CL cs.AIcs.LG

classification cs.CLcs.AIcs.LG
keywords jailbreakinglanguagemodalitiesmodelsacrosspromptsachievesattack
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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We introduce Best-of-N (BoN) Jailbreaking, a simple black-box algorithm that jailbreaks frontier AI systems across modalities. BoN Jailbreaking works by repeatedly sampling variations of a prompt with a combination of augmentations - such as random shuffling or capitalization for textual prompts - until a harmful response is elicited. We find that BoN Jailbreaking achieves high attack success rates (ASRs) on closed-source language models, such as 89% on GPT-4o and 78% on Claude 3.5 Sonnet when sampling 10,000 augmented prompts. Further, it is similarly effective at circumventing state-of-the-art open-source defenses like circuit breakers. BoN also seamlessly extends to other modalities: it jailbreaks vision language models (VLMs) such as GPT-4o and audio language models (ALMs) like Gemini 1.5 Pro, using modality-specific augmentations. BoN reliably improves when we sample more augmented prompts. Across all modalities, ASR, as a function of the number of samples (N), empirically follows power-law-like behavior for many orders of magnitude. BoN Jailbreaking can also be composed with other black-box algorithms for even more effective attacks - combining BoN with an optimized prefix attack achieves up to a 35% increase in ASR. Overall, our work indicates that, despite their capability, language models are sensitive to seemingly innocuous changes to inputs, which attackers can exploit across modalities.

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Cited by 12 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Single Canonical Prompts Underestimate LLM Safety's Surface-Form Sensitivity

    cs.CR 2026-08 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Evaluating LLM safety with one canonical prompt understates unsafe behavior; across five meaning-preserving reformulations, 5-13% of safe-on-canonical seeds become unsafe, and the union exceeds the worst single form f...

  2. A Synonymous Variational Perspective on the Rate-Distortion-Perception Tradeoff

    cs.IT 2026-04 unverdicted novelty 6.0 of 10

    Synset-based reconstruction and synonymous variational inference are claimed to derive the distributional divergence in RDP and unify it with classical rate-distortion theory.

  3. Best-of-N through the Smoothing Lens: KL Divergence and Regret Analysis

    stat.ML 2025-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Smoothed Best-of-N has finite-sample KL and regret bounds under imperfect reward models, and tuning its temperature can make its regret bound beat hard Best-of-N in the overoptimization regime.

  4. Min-p, Max Exaggeration: A Critical Analysis of Min-p Sampling in Language Models

    cs.CL 2025-06 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A comprehensive reanalysis finds that min-p sampling does not outperform top-p, top-k, or basic sampling once the original data are re-tested and hyperparameter budgets are equalized.

  5. Jailbreak-R1: Exploring the Jailbreak Capabilities of LLMs via Reinforcement Learning

    cs.AI 2025-06 reject novelty 6.0 of 10

    A three-stage RL framework (cold start, diversity warm-up, curriculum jailbreak) trains a 7B red-team model that reports SOTA jailbreak ASR and diversity on HarmBench, though the evaluation is compromised by training-...

  6. An Example Safety Case for Safeguards Against Misuse

    cs.LG 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A proposed framework, built around an 'uplift model' that translates red-team safeguard-evasion data into estimated risk, for justifying that AI misuse safeguards keep large-scale harm risk below a threshold.

  7. Audio Jailbreak: An Open Comprehensive Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Audio-Language Models

    cs.SD 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    AJailBench is an open benchmark showing that large audio-language models can be jailbroken through TTS-converted text attacks and through subtle acoustic perturbations that preserve speech semantics.

  8. SATORI: Static Test Oracle Generation for REST APIs

    cs.SE 2025-08 unverdicted novelty 5.0 of 10

    SATORI statically infers REST API test oracles from OpenAPI specs via LLMs, reporting F1 74.3%, above AGORA+'s 69.3%, with 18 confirmed bugs; the supplied full text, however, is a different paper.

  9. MARS: Margin and Semantic-Aware Data Augmentation for Reward Modeling

    cs.LG 2026-02 reject novelty 4.0 of 10

    Concentrating synthetic preference paraphrases on low-margin pairs gives consistent but small reward-model and alignment gains in single-run experiments, while the abstract's semantic-aware, multi-benchmark claims are...

  10. Investigating Vulnerabilities and Defenses Against Audio-Visual Attacks: A Comprehensive Survey Emphasizing Multimodal Models

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A survey that organizes audio and video AI security research into adversarial, backdoor, and jailbreak attacks, with extra attention to multimodal large language models.

  11. JavelinGuard: Low-Cost Transformer Architectures for LLM Security

    cs.LG 2025-06 reject novelty 4.0 of 10

    A study of five small transformer classifier architectures for LLM jailbreak and prompt injection detection claims low-latency accuracy comparable to large models, led by the multi-task Raudra design.

  12. A Red Teaming Roadmap Towards System-Level Safety

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A position paper from Scale AI argues that red teaming research should prioritize product-level safety specifications, realistic attacker models, and system-level monitoring over abstract model-level harm benchmarks.

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