Pith. sign in

REVIEW 4 major objections 6 minor 50 references

A technical solution for the rule of law, peace, security, and evolvability of global cyberspace -- solve the three genetic defects of IP network

T0 review · 4 major / 6 minor · reviewed 2026-08-11 · deepseek-v4-flash

Challenge this review Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗ Review JSON

Pith's one-line read The paper claims that IP's three genetic defects—monopolized governance, missing intrinsic security, and rigidity—can be solved by a blockchain co-governed multi-identifier network that nations jointly manage.

desk verdict A real architecture with unsupported security theorems — the load-bearing 4.8e15-year estimate is deferred, not derived. read the letter →

arxiv 2412.10722 v1 pith:CODMGQTK submitted 2024-12-14 cs.CR cs.NI

Hui Li , Kedan Li , Jiaqing Lv , Yuanshao Liang , Feng Han , Shuo-Yen Robert Li This is my paper · ORCID
classification cs.CRcs.NI
keywords Co-governedMulti-IdentifierNetworkInternetgovernancesecurityblockchainIPprotocoltraceabilitycyberspacesovereigntyidentifierevolution
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

The paper argues that the Internet Protocol has three built-in defects—concentrated governance, no intrinsic mechanism to authenticate or trace packets, and a rigid architecture that resists change—and that none of them can be fixed from inside IP. It proposes the Co-governed Multi-Identifier Network (CoG-MIN, or MIN), a blockchain-based architecture in which nations jointly manage top-level identifiers, every packet is signed by a user bound to a real identity, and network borders are checked by cyberspace customs using passport and visa-style hashes. The paper claims a trilogy of results: deterministic security is impossible within IP, future architectures such as MIN can achieve exponential security improvements, and a combination of technical, managerial, legal, and insurance mechanisms could make cyberspace durably peaceful. If the claims hold, MIN offers a path from the current IP internet to a co-governed, traceable, evolvable network without a disruptive flag-day transition.

What carries the argument

The load-bearing mechanism is the Multi-Identifier System (MIS), a hierarchical consortium blockchain whose PPoV consensus algorithm is claimed to resolve the CAP trilemma and let countries co-manage top-level identifiers through voting. Around it, the paper builds the Multi-Identifier Router (MIR), TLV-encoded packets that support both push and pull semantics, a cyberspace customs layer that attaches visa and passport hashes to each packet, and a biometric identity registry that makes every signed packet traceable. This stack is what converts governance, security, and evolvability from add-on features into properties of the network layer itself.

What would settle it

Run or inspect a red-team test against a MIN private network comparable to the paper's competitions and find a successful full compromise (e.g., remote control of a MIN-V2X vehicle or a forged cyberspace visa/passport accepted by a border router) with effort far below the claimed $4.8 \times 10^{15}$ years; alternatively, recompute the Section 4.7.5 stochastic model from the monograph and show that the expected breach time is orders of magnitude smaller under the stated assumptions.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The central claim is that a complete network architecture, rather than added security protocols, is required to fix the internet. MIN replaces the IP narrow waist with a multi-identifier layer: identity, content, service, IP, and other identifiers coexist, encoded in TLV packets, and are routed by Multi-Identifier Routers (MIR) under the governance of a hierarchical consortium blockchain called the Multi-Identifier System (MIS). User identities are linked to real names and biometrics; packets are signed, activity is logged on-chain, and cyberspace customs issue visas and passports so countries can police their borders. On this basis the paper states Theorem A—no technical solution can give deterministic security inside IP—Theorem B—MIN-class architectures offer exponentially better security, quantified as roughly $4.8 \times 10^{15}$ years to breach a MIN private network—and Conjecture C, that deterministic security can be realized by layering technology with management, law, and insurance. The paper presents competition and deployment evidence that MIN has so far remained unbreached.

Load-bearing premise

The load-bearing premise is that the stochastic process model in the cited monograph correctly predicts how long a MIN network takes to breach, and that every state will actually enforce real-name biometric identity and cyberspace customs; if either part fails, the paper's deterministic-security and exponential-improvement claims do not follow.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • Countries could co-govern top-level identifiers through a voting mechanism, breaking the current concentration of control over address and domain allocation.
  • With every packet signed by a real-name, biometric identity and logged on-chain, attackers cannot hide behind spoofed addresses; misbehavior becomes attributable and repeat offenders can be permanently blocked.
  • MIN is IP-compatible: existing IP devices keep working, and IP packets are routed by MIRs, so the transition away from IP can be gradual and market-driven rather than a flag-day cutover.
  • Network-layer cyberspace customs give each state a technical border it can enforce, including real-time revocation of visas for malicious foreign users.
  • If Theorem B's stochastic estimate is right, a MIN private network would take on the order of $4.8 \times 10^{15}$ years to breach under normal assumptions, an exponential gap over IP networks.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Because the security estimate in Theorem B is deferred entirely to a cited monograph, the exponential claim stands or falls on a model the paper does not show; a reader should treat the $4.8 \times 10^{15}$-year figure as an unverified derived result rather than a demonstrated fact.
  • Traceability depends on universal adoption of real-name biometric identity and on states operating customs and courts cooperatively; if a major state refuses, the architecture's security and co-governance properties degrade in ways the paper does not quantify.
  • The cyberspace customs idea—visa and passport hashes at network borders—is separable from the blockchain governance layer and could plausibly be adopted by any future network architecture that wants sovereign borders.
  • A testable extension: if MIN is deployed at scale, attack attribution times and cross-border incident costs should drop dramatically compared with IP, while states gain a new technical lever to block traffic from named foreign actors.
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

4 major / 6 minor

Summary. This manuscript proposes a Co-governed Multi-Identifier Network (CoG-MIN, abbreviated MIN) as a next-generation network architecture intended to address what the authors call the three 'genetic defects' of IP: unilateral governance, lack of intrinsic security, and architectural rigidity. The paper describes the MIN architecture, including a hierarchical consortium-blockchain-based identifier system (MIS), a multi-identifier router (MIR), a biometric-identity-based authentication and traceability layer, and a 'Cyberspace Customs' border-control protocol. It reports prototype deployments and results from security competitions, and it states a 'trilogy' of results: Theorem A claims no deterministic security solution exists within IP, Theorem B claims MIN (or a similar future architecture) provides an exponential security improvement with an estimated time-to-breach of approximately 4.8e15 years, and Conjecture C proposes that deterministic security can be achieved. The paper's central claim is that MIN is a viable technical basis for global cyberspace governance. The security theorems are not mathematically established in the manuscript as written.

Significance. The potential significance of a viable architecture that provides traceability, co-governance, and strong security would be considerable, and the manuscript does describe a concrete, partially implemented system with some real deployment activity. Credit is due for the breadth of prototype testing reported and for the explicit attempt to connect technical design with governance. However, the core theoretical claims are not substantiated. Theorem A is a non sequitur, Theorem B's quantitative estimate is deferred to an unattached and self-authored source, and the empirical evidence is self-reported without a controlled comparison or raw data. The concept of 'deterministic security' is never formally defined, so the central assertions are not falsifiable in their present form. Given that the quantitative security claim is load-bearing and unsupported, the paper does not meet the evidentiary standard for its conclusions.

major comments (4)
  1. [§5.1, Theorem A] The proof of Theorem A is not a valid impossibility argument. From the premise that the United States has not implemented a deterministic security solution for IP, the text concludes that 'the probability of any other nation achieving it within the IP framework is effectively zero' and hence that no such solution exists. This is a non sequitur: absence of implementation by one actor is not evidence of impossibility, and no exhaustive enumeration of candidate solutions is provided. The manuscript also does not define what 'deterministic security' means, so the theorem's statement is not precise enough to prove. Consequently, the claimed unsolvability of IP security is not established.
  2. [§5.2, Theorem B] The central quantitative claim—that breaching a MIN private network requires approximately 4.8e15 years—is not derived in this manuscript. The text refers the reader to Section 4.7.5 of reference [17], a self-authored monograph, for the 'detailed proof.' No adversary model, per-attempt success probability, attack rate, or parallelism assumption is specified, and no comparison baseline for IP is defined. As a result, the claimed 'exponential improvement' cannot be checked or falsified from the paper. A theorem whose proof is entirely contained in an inaccessible external source does not support the manuscript's conclusion.
  3. [§4.3, Tables 3 and 4] The empirical evidence for MIN's security is reported as aggregate competition statistics (e.g., 10,417,598 attacks over 25 days in one event) with no attack budget, no rules of engagement, no definition of 'compromise,' and no raw dataset. The statement that the system was 'unbreached' in these competitions is anecdotal and cannot establish a breach rate or a security guarantee. Without a controlled comparison in which the same adversaries were given equivalent time and resources against an IP-based baseline under identical scoring rules, the claim that MIN is 'significantly more secure' than IP is not supported.
  4. [§3.5 and §5.3] The traceability and law-enforcement claims rely on universal participation: every user must accept a real-name biometric identity, every state must operate Cyberspace Customs, and non-participating networks must agree to resolve disputes through the proposed cyberspace court. The manuscript does not analyze what happens when these assumptions fail (e.g., a state that declines to implement MIN, or a user who refuses biometric registration). Since the paper presents these governance features as part of the technical solution, the lack of a threat model for non-cooperation is a significant gap in the claimed 'rule of law, peace, and security.'
minor comments (6)
  1. [§3.4, Eqs. (1)-(4)] The notation in Equations (1)–(4) should be clarified: Equation (1) likely means a bitwise AND of UNIX time with 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0, and the 'xor' operation in Equations (3) and (4) is not defined for binary strings of potentially different lengths; please specify bit-lengths and key sizes.
  2. [§4.2, Table 2] The entry 'Non-intranet' in the IP-MIN column is unclear; please specify what was observed in those tests.
  3. [§3.2, Figure 3] The Figure 3 caption uses 'PoV' while the text and reference [12] consistently use 'PPoV'; please harmonize the terminology.
  4. [§5.1(b)] The phrase 'consistently appearing among the top 10 annually' lacks a referent (top 10 of which list or vulnerability index?) and is not a formal premise for the theorem.
  5. [Abstract and §4.5] The statements that MIN 'is about to enter the commercial stage in China' and 'has gradually become a standard' are strong factual claims; they should be supported by specific citable evidence.
  6. [References] Several substantial factual claims are cited to Wikipedia ([20]) or general news articles ([46]); please replace these with primary or peer-reviewed sources where possible.

Circularity Check

2 steps flagged · score 7.0 of 10

Theorem B's 4.8e15-year breach estimate — the quantitative core of the claimed exponential security gain — is deferred to the authors' own monograph [17], and the CAP-trilemma 'uniqueness' of PPoV is imported from self-authored papers.

  1. self citation load bearing [Section 5.2, Theorem B, item (b) "Quantitative Analysis"]
    "Using stochastic process models, such as the martingale framework, breaching a MIN-constructed private network is estimated to require approximately 4.8 × 10^15 years under some normal scenario. For detailed proof, refer to Section 4.7.5 of the referenced monograph [17]."

    The paper's central quantitative claim — that future architectures like MIN provide 'security solutions with exponential performance improvements' — rests on this single number. The derivation is not present in the paper; it is delegated to [17], which is the authors' own monograph (Hui Li and Xin Yang, Springer, 2021). No adversary model, per-attempt success probability, parallel-attack assumption, or scenario parameters are stated, so the estimate cannot be checked or falsified within this paper. This is a load-bearing self-citation: the exponential-security conclusion reduces to an unshown result in the same group's prior work, rather than to an independently demonstrated derivation.

  2. uniqueness imported from authors [Section 1.2 (MIS/PPoV paragraph) and Section 3.2]
    "At the heart of MIS is its unique consortium blockchain consensus algorithm, PPoV[12], which addresses the CAP theorem’s trilemma[13] for distributed systems, achieving optimal complexity and theoretical efficiency."

    The paper's governance and scalability premises depend on the assertion that PPoV uniquely 'addresses the CAP theorem's trilemma' and achieves optimal complexity. The algorithm and the trilemma-solving claim are cited to the authors' own prior work ([12], [13], [36]); no independent proof or external verification is supplied. The 'uniqueness' of the solution is thus imported from a self-citation chain rather than established here, and this imported claim is used to justify the feasibility of MIS co-governance at global scale.

full rationale

The strongest circularity finding is in Theorem B (Section 5.2): the paper explicitly states that the proof of the 4.8 × 10^15-year breach estimate is 'refer to Section 4.7.5 of the referenced monograph [17],' where [17] is the authors' own 2021 Springer monograph. That estimate is the quantitative basis for the claimed exponential security improvement over IP, so the central security theorem is not derived in this paper but is deferred to a self-authored source. Section 5.2's empirical evidence — repeated 'unbreached' outcomes in competitions where the target environments were built by the same group — is presented as supporting the theorem, but survival in a competition cannot establish a breach rate and is not an independent derivation. Section 5.1's Theorem A is not circular in the formal sense, but it is also not a proof: the assertion that a deterministic solution S1 'should already be implemented by the United States' is an unproven assumption, and the observed US breach record does not logically entail that no technical solution exists. I do not flag Theorem A as circularity because it is a non-sequitur rather than a reduction to its inputs. The paper also repeatedly relies on self-authored references for core architecture capabilities (e.g., PPoV and the CAP-trilemma solution), which supports a moderate-to-high circularity score but does not by itself force the conclusion. Overall, because the decisive quantitative security claim is outsourced to the authors' own monograph, the paper's central derivation chain is partly circular, giving a score of 7 rather than 0-2.

Assumptions & free parameters 1 free parameters · 5 assumptions · 2 invented entities

Most technical substance is imported from the authors' previous publications, and the security estimate is imported from a self-authored monograph. The main numeric figure, 4.8e15 years, functions as a free parameter: it is asserted, not derived. Theorems A and B rely on ad hoc axioms about the United States and about stochastic models.

free parameters (1)
  • Estimated breach time for MIN private network = 4.8e15 years
    Theorem B cites this figure to the authors' own monograph [17, Section 4.7.5]; no derivation, model parameters, or uncertainty are given in this paper. It is the quantitative anchor for the exponential-security claim.
assumptions (5)
  • ad hoc to paper If a deterministic cyberspace-security solution for IP existed, the United States would already have implemented it.
    Theorem A(a)-(b), Section 5.1. This premise is neither proven nor self-evident; it converts an empirical counterfactual into an axiom.
  • ad hoc to paper The absence of a solution in the United States implies zero probability of any other nation finding one.
    Theorem A(c), Section 5.1. This inference is logically invalid without additional assumptions.
  • ad hoc to paper A stochastic (martingale) process model of MIN breach time is valid and yields 4.8e15 years.
    Theorem B, Section 5.2. The proof is deferred to the authors' own monograph [17, Section 4.7.5], not reproduced.
  • domain assumption PPoV consensus achieves optimal complexity and solves the CAP trilemma.
    Section 3.2. Asserted from [12] and [36]; no formal proof is given in this paper.
  • domain assumption All packets signed by user private keys and recorded on blockchain guarantee traceability and attribution.
    Section 3.5. Assumes secure key management, biometric binding, and no stolen keys or coercion, which are unstated.
invented entities (2)
  • Co-governed Multi-Identifier Network (CoG-MIN)
    purpose: A next-generation network architecture that replaces IP-based routing and governance with a TLV-encoded multi-identifier system on consortium blockchains.
    The paper provides self-reported prototype and demonstration results and references to the authors' own prior publications, but no independent third-party falsifiable evidence or reproducible artifact is supplied.
  • Cyberspace Customs protocol (cyberspace passport and visa)
    purpose: Border-management mechanism that requires dual hash signatures (CVK and CPK) for cross-domain packets.
    The protocol is described in Section 3.4 and tested in the authors' own companion paper [38]; no independent evaluation or specification sufficient for reproduction is given in this preprint.

how reviews work

0 comments
Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of A technical solution for the rule of law, peace, security, and evolvability of global cyberspace -- solve the three genetic defects of IP network." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/CODMGQTK

@misc{pith2026241210722,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: A technical solution for the rule of law, peace, security, and evolvability of global cyberspace -- solve the three genetic defects of IP network},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/CODMGQTK}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2412.10722}
}
read the original abstract

Since its inception in the 1960s, the internet has profoundly transformed human life. However, its original design now struggles to meet the evolving demands of modern society. Three primary defects have emerged: First, the concentration of power among a few dominant entities has intensified international conflicts and widened the technological divide. Second, the Internet Protocol (IP)-based system lacks inherent security, leading to frequent global cybersecurity incidents. Third, the rigidity of the IP protocol has hindered the sustainable development of cyberspace, as it resists necessary adaptations and innovations. Addressing these issues is crucial for the future resilience and security of the global digital landscape. To address these challenges, we propose the Co-governed Multi-Identifier Network (CoG-MIN briefly as MIN), a novel network architecture that leverages blockchain technology to ensure equal participation of countries worldwide in cyberspace governance and the rule of law. As a next-generation network system, CoG-MIN integrates mechanisms such as user authentication, data signatures, and encryption to significantly enhance network security. In testing environments, CoG-MIN has consistently withstood extensive attacks during various international cybersecurity competitions. Additionally, CoG-MIN supports the evolution and interoperability of different identifier systems, remains IP-compatible, and facilitates a gradual transition away from IP, providing an adaptable ecosystem for diverse network architectures. This adaptability fosters the development and evolution of diverse network architectures within CoG-MIN, making it a natural progression for the internet's future development. We further introduce a trilogy of cyberspace security theorems... (Due to character limitations, the full abstract is available in the paper PDF.)

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2412.10722 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Overall architecture of MIN At the physical layer, MIN employs established protocols and hardware. Similarly, the data link layer leverages proven technologies reinforcing reliability and performance. Significant deviations from traditional IP systems become apparent at the network layer and above. 3.1 Basic architecture of MIN The network layer serves as the cornerstone of the MIN architecture, incorporating a mech… view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Different MIN network packet structures[ [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Multi-Identifier System achieves co-governed network[ [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p009_3.png] view at source ↗
Figures from the paper (6 more)
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Processing flow of MIR for different MIN network packets[ [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p010_4.png]
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Cyberspace Customs protects the sovereignty of each country’s cyberspace border [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_5.png]
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: Different network architectures can coexist in MIN[ [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p014_6.png]
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Deployment of Q-MIN with classical and quantum dual-channel[ [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p015_7.png]
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: Security comparison between IP network and MIN network [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p019_8.png]
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: MIN from the technical level, management level and legal level of a complete set of solutions [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p020_9.png]

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

50 extracted references · 50 canonical work pages

  1. [17]

    Co-governed Sovereignty Network: Legal Basis and Its Prototype & Applications with MIN Architecture

    Hui Li and Xin Yang. Co-governed Sovereignty Network: Legal Basis and Its Prototype & Applications with MIN Architecture. Springer Nature, 2021

    work page 2021

  2. [1]

    Challenges in network management

    Marshall T Rose. Challenges in network management. IEEE Network, 7(6):16–19, 1993

    work page 1993

  3. [2]

    Ruling the root: Internet governance and the taming of cyberspace

    Milton L Mueller. Ruling the root: Internet governance and the taming of cyberspace . MIT press, 2009

    work page 2009

  4. [3]

    The future of the internet: and how to stop it

    Jonathan Zittrain. The future of the internet: and how to stop it . Yale University Press, 2009

    work page 2009

  5. [4]

    The Global War for Internet Governance

    Laura DeNardis. The Global War for Internet Governance . Yale University Press, 2014

    work page 2014

  6. [5]

    A flaw in the design the internet’s founders saw its promise but didn’t foresee users attacking one another, May 2015

    Craig Timberg. A flaw in the design the internet’s founders saw its promise but didn’t foresee users attacking one another, May 2015

    work page 2015

  7. [6]

    From wannacry to wannadie: Security trade-offs and design for implantable medical devices

    Guanglou Zheng, Guanghe Zhang, Wencheng Yang, Craig Valli, Rajan Shankaran, and Mehmet A Orgun. From wannacry to wannadie: Security trade-offs and design for implantable medical devices. In 2017 17th International Symposium on Communications and Information Technologies (ISCIT) , pages 1–5. IEEE, 2017

    work page 2017

  8. [7]

    Atm network: goals and challenges

    BG Kim and Peter Wang. Atm network: goals and challenges. Communications of the ACM, 38(2):39–44, 1995

    work page 1995

Show all 50 references
  1. [8]

    Lan interconnect using x

    John J Barrett and Eberhard F Wunderlich. Lan interconnect using x. 25 network services. IEEE Network , 5(5):12–16, 1991

    1991

  2. [9]

    An overview of frame relay technology

    Daniel B Grossman. An overview of frame relay technology. In 1991Tenth Annual International Phoenix Conference on Computers and Communications , pages 539–540. IEEE Computer Society, 1991

    1991

  3. [10]

    Information-centric networks: a new paradigm for the internet

    Gabriel M De Brito, Pedro B Velloso, and Igor M Moraes. Information-centric networks: a new paradigm for the internet. John Wiley & Sons, 2013

    2013

  4. [11]

    Mis: A multi-identifier management and resolution system in the metaverse

    Han Wang, Hui Li, Abla Smahi, Feng Zhao, Yao Yao, Ching Chuen Chan, Shiyu Wang, Wenyuan Yang, and Shuo- Yen Robert Li. Mis: A multi-identifier management and resolution system in the metaverse. ACM Transactions on Multimedia Computing, Communications and Applications , 20(7):1...

    2024

  5. [12]

    A data lightweight scheme for parallel proof of vote consensus

    Zixian Wang, Hui Li, Han Wang, Zhenwei Xiao, Ping Lu, Zhenyuan Yang, Minglong Zhang, and Peter Han Joo Chong. A data lightweight scheme for parallel proof of vote consensus. In 2021 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data) , pages 3656–3662. IEEE, 2021

    2021

  6. [13]

    Gbt-chain: A system framework for solving the general trilemma in permissioned blockchains

    Han Wang, Hui Li, Abla Smahi, Mingrui Xiao, and Shuo-Yen Robert Li. Gbt-chain: A system framework for solving the general trilemma in permissioned blockchains. Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice, 3(2):1–15, 2024

    2024

  7. [14]

    An identity management protocol for multi-identifier network

    Lihong Lin, Hui Li, Weijuan Yin, Han Wang, He Bai, and Ao Yang. An identity management protocol for multi-identifier network. In 2022 3rd International Conference on Electronics, Communications and Information Technology (CECIT), pages 19–24. IEEE, 2022. 22 A PREPRINT - D ECEM...

    2022

  8. [15]

    Scalable identifier system for industrial internet based on multi-identifier network architecture

    Yunmin Wang, Hui Li, Ting Huang, Xinchun Zhang, and Yongjie Bai. Scalable identifier system for industrial internet based on multi-identifier network architecture. IEEE Internet of Things Journal , 10(3):1919–1932, 2021

    1919

  9. [16]

    General packet network addressing routing and identifier evolution method and system

    Hui Li, Jiangxin Wu, Guohua Wei, and Xiangzhen Meng. General packet network addressing routing and identifier evolution method and system. SCIENTIA SINICA Informationis, 2023

    2023

  10. [18]

    Successful Conclusion of the 27th UN CSTD AI Side Event: Shaping the Future of AI, Apr 2024

    World Digital Technology Academy. Successful Conclusion of the 27th UN CSTD AI Side Event: Shaping the Future of AI, Apr 2024

    2024

  11. [19]

    Cyber power

    Joseph S Nye. Cyber power. Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs . . . , 2010

    2010

  12. [20]

    United States Cyber Command — Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Wikipedia. United States Cyber Command — Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia. org/w/index.php?title=United%20States%20Cyber%20Command&oldid=1235197210, 2024. [Online; accessed 16-October-2024]

    2024

  13. [21]

    The meaning of the cyber revolution: Perils to theory and statecraft

    Lucas Kello. The meaning of the cyber revolution: Perils to theory and statecraft. International Security , 38(2):7–40, 2013

    2013

  14. [22]

    The virtual weapon and international order

    Lucas Kello. The virtual weapon and international order . Yale University Press, 2017

    2017

  15. [23]

    Implementation of ipsec protocol

    Hitesh Dhall, Dolly Dhall, Sonia Batra, and Pooja Rani. Implementation of ipsec protocol. In 2012 Second International Conference on Advanced Computing & Communication Technologies , pages 176–181. IEEE, 2012

    2012

  16. [24]

    Security engineering: a guide to building dependable distributed systems

    Ross Anderson. Security engineering: a guide to building dependable distributed systems . John Wiley & Sons, 2020

    2020

  17. [25]

    Security vulnerabilities in facebook data breach

    Jing Hua and Ping Wang. Security vulnerabilities in facebook data breach. In International Conference on Information Technology-New Generations, pages 159–166. Springer, 2024

    2024

  18. [26]

    General electric, darpa hack claims raise national security concerns, Nov 2023

    Becky Bracken. General electric, darpa hack claims raise national security concerns, Nov 2023

    2023

  19. [27]

    The art of deception: Controlling the human element of security

    Kevin D Mitnick and William L Simon. The art of deception: Controlling the human element of security . John Wiley & Sons, 2003

    2003

  20. [28]

    Internet pioneer robert kahn reflects on internet’s past, contemplates its future, Oct 2007

    Teresa Riordan. Internet pioneer robert kahn reflects on internet’s past, contemplates its future, Oct 2007

    2007

  21. [29]

    Analyzing challenging aspects of ipv6 over ipv4

    Shahzad Ashraf, Durr Muhammad, and Zeeshan Aslam. Analyzing challenging aspects of ipv6 over ipv4. J. Ilm. Tek. Elektro Komput. Dan Inform, 6(1):54–67, 2020

    2020

  22. [30]

    A network architecture containing both push and pull semantics

    Jianming Que, Hui Li, He Bai, Lihong Lin, Soung-Yue Liew, and Lunchakorn Wuttisittikulkij. A network architecture containing both push and pull semantics. In 2021 7th International Conference on Computer and Communications (ICCC), pages 2211–2216. IEEE, 2021

    2021

  23. [31]

    A secure and efficient transport protocol for multi-identifier network

    Mingrui Xiao, He Bai, Hui Li, Xinnan Lin, Xiyu Wang, and Ping Lu. A secure and efficient transport protocol for multi-identifier network. In 2023 9th International Conference on Computer and Communications (ICCC) , pages 1653–1659, 2023

    2023

  24. [32]

    An effective pull-based congestion control protocol for multi-identifier network

    Bin Yin, Hui Li, He Bai, Zhengqi Wu, Ping Lu, Qiongwei Ye, Yong Yang, and Jianping Wu. An effective pull-based congestion control protocol for multi-identifier network. In 2022 IEEE 8th International Conference on Computer and Communications (ICCC) , pages 452–456. IEEE, 2022

    2022

  25. [33]

    H-mis: A hierarchical multi-identifier system based on blockchain

    Qi Lyu, Hui Li, Xinnan Lin, Han Wang, Hanxu Hou, Yuguo Yin, Qianbin Chen, Ping Fan, Gang Wan, Xiang Zhu, et al. H-mis: A hierarchical multi-identifier system based on blockchain. In 2023 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (BigData) , pages 2326–2333. IEEE, 2023

    2023

  26. [34]

    Mir: Multi-identifier router and its prototype

    Xinchun Zhang, Qinshu Chen, and Hui Li. Mir: Multi-identifier router and its prototype. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Computer and Communications Management , pages 103–107, 2020

    2020

  27. [35]

    A demonstration of the solid platform for social web applications

    Essam Mansour, Andrei Vlad Sambra, Sandro Hawke, Maged Zereba, Sarven Capadisli, Abdurrahman Ghanem, Ashraf Aboulnaga, and Tim Berners-Lee. A demonstration of the solid platform for social web applications. In Proceedings of the 25th international conference companion on world...

    2016

  28. [36]

    Proof of vote: A high-performance consensus protocol based on vote mechanism & consortium blockchain

    Kejiao Li, Hui Li, Hanxu Hou, Kedan Li, and Yongle Chen. Proof of vote: A high-performance consensus protocol based on vote mechanism & consortium blockchain. In 2017 IEEE 19th International Conference on High Performance Computing and Communications, pages 466–473. IEEE, 2017

    2017

  29. [37]

    Co-governed space-terrestrial integrated network architecture and prototype based on min

    Guohua Wei, Hui Li, Yongiie Bai, Xin Yang, Huayu Zhang, JianMing Que, and Wenjun Li. Co-governed space-terrestrial integrated network architecture and prototype based on min. In 2021 International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN) , pages 1–6. IEEE, 20...

    2021

  30. [38]

    A border management protocol for multi- identifier network within the network layer and its attack detection extension

    Jiaqing Lyu, Hui Li, Kedan Li, Yuanshao Liang, and Zhengqi Wu. A border management protocol for multi- identifier network within the network layer and its attack detection extension. In 20th International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks , 2024

    2024

  31. [39]

    Secrets and lies: digital security in a networked world

    Bruce Schneier. Secrets and lies: digital security in a networked world . John Wiley & Sons, 2015

    2015

  32. [40]

    The shallows: What the Internet is doing to our brains

    Nicholas Carr. The shallows: What the Internet is doing to our brains . WW Norton & Company, 2020

    2020

  33. [41]

    A high-security communication method that supports routing addressing of quantum identifiers at the network layer, CN 116527248B, China Patent

    Hui Li, Xiangzhen Meng, and Lihong Lin. A high-security communication method that supports routing addressing of quantum identifiers at the network layer, CN 116527248B, China Patent

  34. [42]

    Principles and Applications of Blockchain Systems: How to Break Through Consensus Trilemma in Consortium Blockchains

    Hui Li and Han Wang. Principles and Applications of Blockchain Systems: How to Break Through Consensus Trilemma in Consortium Blockchains. Wiley-IEEE Press, 2025

    2025

  35. [43]

    Frontier Problems in Quantum Mechanics

    Lee Chang and Molin Ge. Frontier Problems in Quantum Mechanics. World Scientific Publishing, 2018

    2018

  36. [44]

    Q-pnv: A quantum consensus mechanism for security consortium blockchains

    Jianming Lin, Hui Li, Hongjian Xing, Runhuai Huang, Weixiang Huang, Shaowen Deng, Yanping Zhang, Weimin Zeng, Ping Lu, Xiyu Wang, Tao Sun, and Xiongyan Tang. Q-pnv: A quantum consensus mechanism for security consortium blockchains. arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.06325, 2024

    2024 arXiv

  37. [45]

    Driving with sharks: Rethinking connected vehicles with vehicle cybersecurity

    Mahmoud Hashem Eiza and Qiang Ni. Driving with sharks: Rethinking connected vehicles with vehicle cybersecurity. IEEE V ehicular Technology Magazine, 12(2):45–51, 2017

    2017

  38. [46]

    19-year-old claims he hacked into over 25 teslas in 13 countries, Jan 2022

    Ariel Zilber. 19-year-old claims he hacked into over 25 teslas in 13 countries, Jan 2022

    2022

  39. [47]

    Application demonstration and current network testing of mimic defense

    Jiangxing Wu. Application demonstration and current network testing of mimic defense. Cyberspace Mimic Defense: Generalized Robust Control and Endogenous Security , pages 683–735, 2020

    2020

  40. [48]

    Min: Co-governing multi-identifier network architecture and its prototype on operator’s network

    Hui Li, Jiangxing Wu, Xin Yang, Han Wang, Julong Lan, Ke Xu, Hua Tan, Jinwu Wei, Wei Liang, Fusheng Zhu, Yiqin Lu, Wai Ho Mow, Yeung Wai-Ho, Zefeng Zheng, Peng Yi, Xinsheng Ji, Qinrang Liu, Wei Li, Kaiyan Tian, Jiang Zhu, Jiaxing Song, Yijun Liu, Junfeng Ma, Jiawei Hu, Jiansen...

    2020

  41. [49]

    Min-mqtt: A publish/subscribe approach based on multi-identifier network in v2x

    Yihang Chen, Hui Li, He Bai, Zixian Ding, Zhan Guo, Xiyu Wang, and Ping Lu. Min-mqtt: A publish/subscribe approach based on multi-identifier network in v2x. In 2024 3rd International Joint Conference on Information and Communication Engineering, 2024

    2024

  42. [50]

    A cooperative caching scheme in min-v2x

    Zixian Ding, Hui Li, He Bai, Yihang Chen, Xiyu Wang, and Ping Lu. A cooperative caching scheme in min-v2x. In 2024 3rd International Joint Conference on Information and Communication Engineering , 2024. 24

    2024

Pith tools

Reviewed August 11, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.