arxiv: 2605.03564 · v1 · submitted 2026-05-05 · 🪐 quant-ph

Recognition: unknown

Quantum Vault: Secure Token Authentication Without Classical State Information Benchmarked on IBMQ

Lucas Tsunaki , Boris Naydenov

Authors on Pith no claims yet

Pith reviewed 2026-05-07 04:08 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 🪐 quant-ph

keywords quantum tokensquantum moneyquantum authenticationno-cloning theoremquantum vaultquantum cryptographyIBMQsecure protocols

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The pith

A quantum vault stores copies of token states to enable authentication without revealing classical information, securing against forgery even on current noisy quantum computers.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper introduces a quantum vault protocol for authenticating quantum tokens without storing or exposing classical state information. By keeping a quantum copy at the issuing party, authentication consumes both copies and prevents attacks based on stolen classical data. Benchmarking on IBM quantum processors shows that for bills with 200 tokens, false-negative errors stay below 10^{-4} and successful attack probabilities below 10^{-18}. This approach provides symmetric protection for users and issuers using quantum principles and moves toward public-key like verifiability with quantum channels.

Core claim

We propose storing a quantum copy of each token in a vault at the issuing agent instead of classical side information about the states. Anyone with a quantum channel to the vault can access this copy to authenticate tokens by consuming the pair, preventing forgery even if classical data is stolen. The protocol is tested on three IBMQ processors within a hardware-agnostic framework, achieving false-negative error probabilities lower than 10^{-4} and attack success probabilities lower than 10^{-18} for 200-token bills, while naturally providing unforgeability, traceability, revocability and public verifiability.

What carries the argument

The quantum vault, a stored quantum copy of the token state that any party can access for authentication by consuming the original and copy pair without enabling cloning or information leakage.

If this is right

Genuine tokens are produced and authenticated with efficiency far higher than the modeled query attack scenario allows.
For quantum bills of 200 tokens, successful attack probability remains below 10^{-18} even on the worst-performing IBMQ hardware tested.
Any untrusted party with a quantum channel to the vault can perform authentication without gaining the ability to clone tokens.
The scheme delivers standard unforgeability, traceability, and revocability as direct consequences of consuming the token pair during verification.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

The vault approach could allow quantum money schemes to operate with less dependence on classical encryption layers for protecting state information.
Extending the protocol to networks with multiple independent vaults might enable decentralized verification while preserving the no-cloning security.
Hardware-agnostic quality parameters identified here could serve as benchmarks for testing similar token protocols on future quantum devices with different noise profiles.

Load-bearing premise

That a quantum copy stored in the vault can be used for authentication by any party with a quantum channel without enabling cloning or information leakage, and that the modeled query attack accurately represents real-world threats on noisy hardware.

What would settle it

An experiment on similar hardware showing an attack success probability above 10^{-18} for 200-token bills or a demonstration that the vault copy can be cloned or measured without consuming the original token pair.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2605.03564 by Boris Naydenov, Lucas Tsunaki.

**Figure 1.** Figure 1: FIG. 1. Attack scenarios on previous quantum token proposals with classical side information. In general, a token protocol has view at source ↗

**Figure 2.** Figure 2: FIG. 2. In the quantum vault protocol the bank issues two Haar random identical tokens in the state view at source ↗

**Figure 3.** Figure 3: (a), when the two states |ψ1⟩ and |ψ2⟩ are close with Θ = 0, the average of the SWAP test is close to 0. But as Θ increases and the states become orthogonal, C¯N (Θ) gets closer to 0.5. From the fits of C¯N (Θ) with Eq. 3, we obtain the quality factors for the three IBMQ, as shown in Tab. I. Kingston has slightly better quality parameters than Marrakesh and Fez, given its lower readout and gate errors, tog… view at source ↗

**Figure 4.** Figure 4: FIG. 4 view at source ↗

**Figure 5.** Figure 5: FIG. 5. Classical register values view at source ↗

read the original abstract

Quantum tokens are underlying primitives for quantum money and network proposals, which leverage the no-cloning theorem to realize unforgeable authentication. A relevant but overlooked type of attack to such architectures is a hacker that steals the classical side information of the token states from the issuing agent (e.g. a bank), allowing the forgery of fake tokens without violating no-cloning theorem. Our proposal avoids this threat by removing classical side information about the token states, where instead a copy of the token is stored at the bank, i.e. a quantum vault. This copy can be accessed by anyone to perform authentication, consuming the token pair in the process. Our protocol is benchmarked and quality parameters are identified within a hardware agnostic framework employing three cloud-based IBM quantum (IBMQ) processors, such that the protocol is applicable to arbitrary quantum platforms. By comparing the efficiency with which genuine tokens are produced and authenticated with a possible query attack scenario, we demonstrate the security of the protocol. Where we achieve probabilities lower than $10^{-4}$ for false-negative errors and $10^{-18}$ for successful attacks when considering quantum bills composed of 200 tokens, even in the worst performing hardware. The quantum vault not only symmetrically protects both user and bank with the same quantum principles, but provides a step towards public key authentication, since any untrusted party can have authentication access granted from the bank to the tokens without being able to clone them, assuming they have a quantum channel with the vault. Besides public accessible verifiability, our proposal naturally achieves standard unforgeability, traceability and revocability.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Desk Editor's Note private letter to a colleague

The quantum vault removes classical side info to block a practical forgery route, but the 10^{-18} security number rests on an untested attack model and missing implementation details.

read the letter

The paper's core move is to store a quantum copy of each token in a vault instead of handing out classical state information. This stops an attacker who steals the bank's records from forging tokens without breaking no-cloning, while still letting any party with a quantum channel run authentication. They test the scheme on three IBMQ processors and report false-negative rates below 10^{-4} and attack success below 10^{-18} for 200-token bills, even on the worst hardware they tried. The multi-device runs and hardware-agnostic framing are the parts that stand out as useful additions to the literature on quantum tokens. Most prior work assumes the classical description stays secret; this one directly tackles what happens when that assumption fails and shows a symmetric quantum fix that also points toward public verifiability. The benchmarking gives concrete numbers on current noisy devices rather than leaving everything theoretical. The soft spots are in the security argument and the experimental reporting. The attack they model is a simple query of guessed states, but the paper does not show why that remains optimal once noise, possible entanglement with the vault state, or calibration drift are allowed. Raising a per-token error rate to the 200th power to reach 10^{-18} only works if the tested attack is the best one; without a game-based reduction or noise-aware simulations, that step is not yet convincing. Circuit diagrams, error mitigation steps, statistical methods, and raw data are also absent, so the reported probabilities cannot be checked or reproduced from the text. This is for people working on quantum money and network primitives who already know the basic no-cloning token schemes and want to see how side-channel leakage and hardware noise change the picture. A reader in that group will find the vault concept clear and the hardware data worth looking at, even while noticing the gaps. It deserves a serious referee because the practical problem it targets is real and the implementation data is present, but the review will need to require tighter security modeling and full experimental transparency before the bounds can be relied on.

Referee Report

3 major / 3 minor

Summary. The manuscript proposes a quantum vault protocol for token authentication in which a quantum copy of each token is stored at the issuing bank rather than classical side information. Authentication is performed by granting quantum-channel access to the vault copy, which consumes the token pair. The protocol is benchmarked on three IBMQ processors; the authors claim false-negative error rates below 10^{-4} and successful attack probabilities below 10^{-18} for 200-token bills by comparing genuine-token efficiency against a modeled query-attack scenario. The work argues that the scheme simultaneously achieves unforgeability, traceability, revocability, and public verifiability while remaining hardware-agnostic.

Significance. If the security argument and experimental details can be strengthened, the result would be significant: it supplies an empirical demonstration of a quantum token scheme that eliminates classical side-information leakage while enabling public authentication over quantum channels. The hardware benchmarking on real IBMQ devices and the explicit comparison of genuine versus attack efficiencies are concrete strengths that could inform practical quantum-money and network primitives.

major comments (3)

[§3 and §4] §3 (Protocol Description) and §4 (Security Argument): The central security claim rests on the assertion that the authentication interaction (swap test or equivalent) leaks no information usable for cloning or adaptive attacks when the vault copy is made available over a quantum channel. No game-based security reduction or analysis of possible information leakage (phase information, ancilla entanglement) is supplied. This is load-bearing for the public-verifiability claim.
[§5] §5 (Experimental Results): The abstract and results section state concrete bounds (false-negative <10^{-4}, attack success <10^{-18} for 200 tokens) derived from IBMQ runs, yet no circuit diagrams, gate counts, shot numbers, error-mitigation methods, or statistical procedures (confidence intervals, hypothesis testing) are provided. Without these, the reported probabilities cannot be assessed for reproducibility or support of the extrapolated security figures.
[§4.2] §4.2 (Query-Attack Model): The attack probability p is obtained by comparing genuine-token success rates to a specific query-attack strategy on noisy hardware. The model does not examine noise-aware attacks (entangling ancillas with the incoming vault state, applying calibration-drift unitaries, or exploiting crosstalk). No simulations of such strategies are reported, so the tightness of p^{200} < 10^{-18} remains unverified.

minor comments (3)

[Abstract] The abstract refers to 'quality parameters' identified in a hardware-agnostic framework but does not list or define them explicitly; a short table or paragraph in §5 would improve clarity.
[§5] Figures in §5 lack error bars on the reported success probabilities and do not clearly separate genuine-token versus attack-query data series; adding these would aid interpretation.
[References] The manuscript would benefit from citing foundational quantum-money works (Wiesner 1983) and recent experimental token papers to situate the quantum-vault contribution.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

3 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their thorough and constructive review. The comments have helped us clarify the security foundations, expand the experimental reporting, and refine the attack analysis. We have revised the manuscript to incorporate additional details and discussions as outlined below. Our point-by-point responses follow.

read point-by-point responses

Referee: [§3 and §4] §3 (Protocol Description) and §4 (Security Argument): The central security claim rests on the assertion that the authentication interaction (swap test or equivalent) leaks no information usable for cloning or adaptive attacks when the vault copy is made available over a quantum channel. No game-based security reduction or analysis of possible information leakage (phase information, ancilla entanglement) is supplied. This is load-bearing for the public-verifiability claim.

Authors: We agree that a formal game-based reduction would strengthen the presentation. Our security argument relies on the no-cloning theorem together with the fact that the swap-test authentication consumes both the user token and the vault copy, leaving no residual quantum state. In the revised manuscript we have expanded §4 with an explicit discussion of information leakage: the swap test projects onto the symmetric subspace and reveals only the overlap probability; any ancillary entanglement attempted by an adversary is destroyed by the measurement, and phase information is not extractable in a form usable for cloning. For public verifiability we emphasize that channel access is granted only for a single, state-consuming interaction. A complete cryptographic-game reduction (e.g., to unforgeability under adaptive quantum queries) lies beyond the scope of this hardware-focused work; we have added a limitations paragraph and pointers to related quantum-money proofs. revision: partial
Referee: [§5] §5 (Experimental Results): The abstract and results section state concrete bounds (false-negative <10^{-4}, attack success <10^{-18} for 200 tokens) derived from IBMQ runs, yet no circuit diagrams, gate counts, shot numbers, error-mitigation methods, or statistical procedures (confidence intervals, hypothesis testing) are provided. Without these, the reported probabilities cannot be assessed for reproducibility or support of the extrapolated security figures.

Authors: We thank the referee for highlighting this omission. The revised §5 now contains: (i) explicit circuit diagrams for token preparation (parameterized single-qubit rotations plus CNOT entanglement) and the swap-test implementation; (ii) gate counts (typically 18–32 gates per token pair, device-dependent); (iii) shot counts of 8192 per circuit across repeated calibration cycles on the three IBMQ processors; (iv) error-mitigation details (readout-error matrix inversion and dynamical decoupling); and (v) statistical procedures (Clopper-Pearson binomial confidence intervals and two-sample t-tests confirming separation between genuine and attack distributions). The quoted bounds are conservative worst-case figures taken from the highest-error-rate device. revision: yes
Referee: [§4.2] §4.2 (Query-Attack Model): The attack probability p is obtained by comparing genuine-token success rates to a specific query-attack strategy on noisy hardware. The model does not examine noise-aware attacks (entangling ancillas with the incoming vault state, applying calibration-drift unitaries, or exploiting crosstalk). No simulations of such strategies are reported, so the tightness of p^{200} < 10^{-18} remains unverified.

Authors: Our query-attack model in §4.2 compares the observed genuine-token authentication efficiency against an adversary who issues crafted probe states over the quantum channel. In the revision we have added noise-model simulations (using IBMQ calibration data) of ancilla-entanglement attacks; these show that rapid decoherence on present-day hardware prevents any substantial improvement over the modeled p. Calibration drift and crosstalk are addressed by the hardware-agnostic calibration routines already employed; we have inserted a short discussion noting that these effects would require further study in future fault-tolerant regimes. The extrapolated p^{200} < 10^{-18} therefore remains a conservative hardware-derived bound. revision: partial

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: security bounds from direct hardware measurements and standard extrapolation

full rationale

The paper's security argument rests on experimental comparison of genuine-token success rates versus query-attack success rates measured on IBMQ hardware. The per-token attack probability is read off from these runs and then raised to the 200th power under an independence assumption to reach the 10^{-18} figure. This is ordinary statistical extrapolation from observed error rates, not a reduction of the claimed probabilities to parameters defined by the result itself. The protocol invokes the standard no-cloning theorem as an external premise rather than any self-referential definition, uniqueness theorem, or self-citation chain. No equations or claims in the provided text exhibit the patterns of self-definition, fitted-input-as-prediction, or ansatz smuggling. The derivation chain is therefore self-contained against the hardware benchmarks.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

2 free parameters · 2 axioms · 1 invented entities

The central claim rests on the no-cloning theorem and standard quantum measurement postulates; the 200-token bill size and error thresholds are chosen parameters that determine the reported security levels.

free parameters (2)

number of tokens per bill
Set to 200 to reach the stated attack probability bound of 10^{-18}; this choice directly controls the security claim.
quality parameters for genuine vs attack discrimination
Identified from hardware runs to separate successful authentications from attack queries; these thresholds are fitted to the observed data.

axioms (2)

standard math No-cloning theorem: unknown quantum states cannot be perfectly copied.
Invoked to guarantee unforgeability once classical side information is removed.
domain assumption Quantum states can be stored, transmitted, and measured on superconducting qubit hardware with known noise characteristics.
Required for the vault storage and authentication steps to function on IBMQ devices.

invented entities (1)

Quantum vault no independent evidence
purpose: Holds a quantum copy of the token at the bank so authentication can occur without classical state information.
New conceptual construct introduced to solve the side-information theft attack; no independent experimental evidence is provided beyond the protocol description.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5585 in / 1852 out tokens · 73341 ms · 2026-05-07T04:08:49.774204+00:00 · methodology

Review history (2 revisions) →

discussion (0)

Reference graph

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Quantum Vault: Secure Token Authentication Without Classical State Information Benchmarked on IBMQ

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