arxiv: 2605.06881 · v1 · submitted 2026-05-07 · 💻 cs.NI

Recognition: 2 theorem links

· Lean Theorem

Toward Quantum-Safe 6G: Experimental Evaluation of Post-Quantum Cryptography Techniques

Ananya Kudaloor , Adnan Aijaz

Authors on Pith no claims yet

Pith reviewed 2026-05-11 01:07 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.NI

keywords post-quantum cryptography6G networksNIST PQCML-KEMML-DSAhandshake performancebandwidth efficiencyedge computing

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The pith

Post-quantum cryptography algorithms keep computation acceptable but enlarge messages enough to impair handshake reliability and bandwidth use in 6G edge networks.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

This paper tests standardized post-quantum cryptography schemes for the quantum-safe requirements of 6G wireless networks that span core systems, edge nodes, and constrained IoT devices. It runs benchmarks on ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and Falcon using OpenSSL and the OQS provider across different hardware platforms. The work shows that calculation times remain practical while the larger sizes of ciphertexts and signatures create measurable problems for wireless handshakes and data throughput, most noticeably at the network edge. These outcomes matter because 6G must integrate quantum-resistant security without breaking latency or reliability limits in real wireless environments. The evaluation therefore identifies concrete system-level trade-offs that future designs must address.

Core claim

Benchmarks conducted with OpenSSL and the OQS provider on heterogeneous platforms demonstrate that ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and Falcon deliver acceptable computational performance, yet their expanded ciphertext and signature sizes significantly reduce handshake reliability and bandwidth efficiency in bandwidth- and latency-limited wireless systems, with the strongest effects appearing at the network edge.

What carries the argument

Experimental measurement of computational cost, ciphertext size, signature size, and handshake success rates for NIST-selected PQC algorithms on varied hardware platforms.

If this is right

6G protocol stacks will need adjustments to accommodate larger PQC payloads without losing handshake success.
Edge nodes and IoT devices will require additional bandwidth allocation or compression techniques for quantum-safe security.
Deployment strategies must weigh the acceptable computation times against the observed size penalties in wireless settings.
Optimization of PQC algorithms or hybrid classical-PQC approaches becomes necessary to maintain efficiency at the network edge.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

Real-time wireless channel effects such as packet loss may amplify the handshake reliability problems beyond what platform benchmarks capture.
Standardization efforts for 6G security could incorporate message-size limits as an explicit selection criterion for PQC algorithms.
Hybrid schemes that combine classical and post-quantum methods might offer a practical middle ground for early 6G rollouts.

Load-bearing premise

That results from OpenSSL and OQS benchmarks on mixed hardware platforms will accurately reflect how the same algorithms behave inside live 6G wireless networks that operate under real-time constraints and connect diverse IoT devices.

What would settle it

A test in an actual 6G prototype that records handshake failure rates and bandwidth consumption when PQC algorithms replace classical cryptography and shows no measurable degradation from increased message sizes.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2605.06881 by Adnan Aijaz, Ananya Kudaloor.

**Figure 1.** Figure 1: End-to-end evaluation workflows for PQC. (A) Algorithm level evaluation workflow for PQC primitives using [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p002_1.png] view at source ↗

**Figure 2.** Figure 2: Primitive level performance evaluation of post-quantum key exchange schemes. (a) Liboqs benchmarking results, (b) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_2.png] view at source ↗

**Figure 4.** Figure 4: presents the TLS 1.3 handshake throughput, measured in connections per second (CPS), using the evaluation workflow illustrated in Fig. 1d. It compares ML-KEM-768 and X25519+ML-KEM-768 on two paths: i7–i7 and Raspberry Pi–i7. The main observation is the clear throughput drop when moving from the homogeneous desktop-class path to the heterogeneous edge-style path. At the same time, MLKEM-768 and X25519+ML… view at source ↗

read the original abstract

6G networks will require quantum-secure cryptography deployed across core infrastructure, edge nodes, resource-constrained IoT devices. Although post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms have been standardized by NIST, their practical deployability in bandwidth and latency limited wireless systems remains unclear. This paper presents a practical evaluation of NIST selected PQC schemes, including ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and Falcon. Benchmarks conducted with OpenSSL and the OQS provider on heterogeneous platforms show that while computational performance is acceptable, ciphertext and signature size expansion significantly impact handshake reliability and bandwidth efficiency, particularly at the network edge. The results highlight key system-level trade-offs and motivate the need for PQC optimization and deployment-aware design for future quantum-secure 6G networks.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Desk Editor's Note private letter to a colleague

Benchmarks flag PQC size growth as a 6G edge issue but infer reliability effects from measurements rather than testing them over wireless links.

read the letter

The main thing to know is that this paper benchmarks several NIST post-quantum crypto algorithms for 6G wireless use and concludes that size growth is the bigger issue than compute time for edge deployments. They ran tests with OpenSSL and OQS on varied platforms for ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and Falcon. The work shows acceptable performance on computation but points to ciphertext and signature expansion as a potential drag on bandwidth efficiency and handshake success rates, especially in resource-limited settings. This application to 6G edge and IoT scenarios is the fresh angle, since general PQC benchmarks already exist. It does well by using standard libraries and heterogeneous hardware to make the numbers more relevant to real systems. The soft spot is in how they link the size data to reliability impacts. The benchmarks give sizes and CPU cycles, but there is no direct testing of handshakes over wireless channels that include factors like packet loss, variable latency, or 6G-specific PHY constraints. The reliability effect is inferred from the size increases alone, which may or may not translate depending on the network stack. Details on the exact experimental setup, error bars, and full results are not fully expanded in the available text, which keeps the soundness at a moderate level. This paper suits readers who work on quantum-safe network design or 6G standardization. They can use the trade-off observations as a starting point for their own evaluations. It deserves peer review because the topic is current and the approach is empirical with reproducible tools. A referee can ask for more on the wireless modeling and any additional data. I would recommend putting it through review rather than rejecting it outright.

Referee Report

1 major / 2 minor

Summary. The manuscript presents an experimental evaluation of NIST-standardized post-quantum cryptographic schemes (ML-KEM/Kyber, ML-DSA/Dilithium, and Falcon) for 6G networks. Benchmarks performed with OpenSSL and the OQS provider on heterogeneous platforms indicate acceptable computational performance, but the authors conclude that the resulting increases in ciphertext and signature sizes significantly degrade handshake reliability and bandwidth efficiency, especially at the network edge, and call for PQC optimization and deployment-aware design.

Significance. If the size-based inferences are validated, the work is significant for highlighting concrete system-level trade-offs in deploying quantum-safe cryptography in bandwidth- and latency-constrained 6G environments. It supplies practical benchmark data on standard tools that can guide early design decisions for core, edge, and IoT components, complementing purely theoretical analyses of PQC.

major comments (1)

[Abstract] Abstract: the claim that ciphertext and signature size expansion 'significantly impact handshake reliability and bandwidth efficiency, particularly at the network edge' is not supported by direct evidence. The described evaluation consists of size and CPU-cycle measurements on heterogeneous platforms; no end-to-end handshake experiments under wireless conditions (MTU limits, packet loss, variable latency, or 6G PHY/MAC models) are reported, so the reliability impact is inferred rather than observed.

minor comments (2)

[Abstract] Abstract and methodology description: no raw data, error bars, or platform-specific quantitative results (e.g., exact byte expansions or cycle counts) are provided, which reduces verifiability of the performance claims.
The manuscript would benefit from a summary table comparing key/signature sizes and handshake overheads across the evaluated schemes to make the trade-off analysis more transparent.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

1 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the detailed review and constructive feedback on our manuscript. We address the major comment below, clarifying the scope of our experimental results and inferences while proposing targeted revisions to improve precision.

read point-by-point responses

Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the claim that ciphertext and signature size expansion 'significantly impact handshake reliability and bandwidth efficiency, particularly at the network edge' is not supported by direct evidence. The described evaluation consists of size and CPU-cycle measurements on heterogeneous platforms; no end-to-end handshake experiments under wireless conditions (MTU limits, packet loss, variable latency, or 6G PHY/MAC models) are reported, so the reliability impact is inferred rather than observed.

Authors: We agree that the system-level claims regarding handshake reliability and bandwidth efficiency are inferences drawn from our direct measurements of ciphertext/signature sizes and CPU cycles using OpenSSL and the OQS provider, rather than from end-to-end wireless handshake experiments incorporating MTU constraints, packet loss, or 6G PHY/MAC models. The manuscript's focus was on benchmarking the standardized PQC primitives (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, Falcon) across heterogeneous platforms to quantify the concrete size overheads (e.g., ML-KEM-768 ciphertexts of ~1 KB versus 32 bytes for classical ECDH) and their computational costs. These size increases can be expected to affect reliability in edge scenarios due to well-established networking effects such as IP fragmentation when exceeding typical wireless MTUs and increased transmission times. However, we did not perform the full wireless channel simulations the referee correctly notes are absent. To address this, we will revise the abstract to replace 'significantly impact' with 'are expected to impact' or equivalent phrasing that distinguishes measured results from inferred implications. We will also expand the discussion section to explicitly state the inferential basis, reference standard MTU and fragmentation models, and outline future work on end-to-end evaluations under realistic 6G conditions. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

Empirical benchmark study with no derivations or self-referential modeling

full rationale

This is an experimental evaluation paper that reports direct benchmarks of PQC algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, Falcon) using OpenSSL and OQS on heterogeneous platforms. No equations, fitted parameters, predictions derived from models, or derivation chains appear in the provided text or abstract. Claims about performance and size impacts rest on measured data rather than any self-definitional, fitted-input, or self-citation reduction. The work is self-contained as an empirical study with no load-bearing circular steps.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 0 axioms · 0 invented entities

No free parameters, axioms, or invented entities are introduced; the paper relies on externally standardized NIST PQC algorithms and established benchmarking libraries.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5432 in / 1049 out tokens · 39340 ms · 2026-05-11T01:07:47.856347+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

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