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arxiv: 2605.13069 · v2 · submitted 2026-05-13 · 💻 cs.CY

Recognition: no theorem link

Not All Anquan Is the Same: A Terminological Proposal for Chinese Computer Science and Engineering

Xingyu Zhao
Authors on Pith no claims yet

Pith reviewed 2026-05-15 06:04 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CY
keywords safety and security terminologyChinese computer sciencerisk analysisstandards interpretationAI governanceassurance argumentationfunctional safetycybersecurity
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The pith

Chinese technical discourse should use 'anbao' for security and reserve 'anquan' for safety to avoid conceptual compression.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

In Chinese computer science and engineering the single word 'anquan' has long translated both safety and security. This creates ongoing compression when standards, risk assessments, and research arguments need to separate non-adversarial harm from adversarial threats. The paper proposes that scholarly and engineering writing adopt 'anbao' for security while keeping 'anquan' mainly for safety, leaving existing legal and standards titles unchanged. The distinction is presented as necessary for clearer interdisciplinary work, more precise risk analysis, and arguments that can be examined in areas such as functional safety, automotive cybersecurity, and AI governance. A staged dual-track practice is outlined for moving to the new usage.

Core claim

The paper claims that the overloaded use of 'anquan' for both safety and security produces persistent conceptual compression that affects standards interpretation, risk analysis, and the examinability of scientific arguments in Chinese technical discourse. Surveying boundaries in international and Chinese standards and tracing effects on functional safety, SOTIF, information security, and AI governance, it shows why precise terminology matters for assurance and co-assurance work. The central proposal is therefore to translate security as 'anbao' and reserve 'anquan' for safety in scholarly and engineering writing, while retaining established legal titles, and to implement this through staged

What carries the argument

The proposed terminological split that assigns 'anquan' to safety and 'anbao' to security, which separates the two concepts so that risk communication and assurance arguments can be stated without overload.

If this is right

  • Standards interpretation in Chinese contexts would align more closely with the distinct safety and security boundaries used in international documents.
  • Risk analysis could separate non-adversarial harm from adversarial threats without repeated clarification.
  • Arguments in AI assurance and safety-security co-assurance would become easier to examine and challenge.
  • Interdisciplinary collaboration in engineering projects would face fewer translation-induced misunderstandings.
  • A staged dual-track writing practice would allow gradual adoption without disrupting existing legal titles.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The same distinction might reduce translation friction when Chinese policy documents reference global AI safety frameworks.
  • Standards bodies could later embed the split directly into new Chinese national standards rather than relying on individual writing choices.
  • Other technical fields in Chinese that currently merge safety and security terms might adopt parallel splits once the computer-science precedent is established.

Load-bearing premise

The current single-term usage of 'anquan' creates persistent conceptual compression that materially affects standards interpretation, risk analysis, and the examinability of scientific arguments in Chinese technical discourse.

What would settle it

Compare a matched set of Chinese technical papers and standards written before and after consistent adoption of 'anbao' for security; a measurable drop in documented misreadings of safety versus security requirements or in reviewer requests for clarification would support the claim, while unchanged rates of ambiguity would challenge it.

read the original abstract

In Chinese computer science and engineering, safety and security have long been translated by the same word, "anquan". This convention is concise in ordinary communication, but it creates persistent conceptual compression in standards interpretation, interdisciplinary collaboration, risk analysis and academic writing. When researchers need to discuss both whether a system is free from intolerable non-adversarial harm and whether it can resist adversarial threats, the single word "anquan" often cannot carry the distinction. This article argues that, while established legal and standards titles should be retained, scholarly and engineering writing should translate security as "anbao", and reserve "anquan" mainly for safety. This is not a cosmetic translation preference, but a proposal for terminological governance in scientific cognition, engineering risk communication and assurance argumentation. The article first surveys the conceptual boundary between safety and security in international and Chinese standards, and analyzes how the current translation overload affects functional safety, SOTIF, information security, cybersecurity, automotive cybersecurity and AI governance. It then uses recent work on AI assurance, safety-security co-assurance and security-informed safety to show why precise terminology is fundamental to scientific arguments that can be examined, challenged and communicated. Finally, it proposes a staged, dual-track writing practice for Chinese technical discourse.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The manuscript proposes distinguishing safety and security in Chinese computer science and engineering by retaining 'anquan' primarily for safety while introducing 'anbao' for security. It argues that the current single-term usage creates persistent conceptual compression in standards interpretation, interdisciplinary collaboration, risk analysis, and assurance argumentation. The paper surveys conceptual boundaries in international and Chinese standards, analyzes impacts on functional safety, SOTIF, cybersecurity, automotive cybersecurity, and AI governance, draws on recent work on AI assurance and safety-security co-assurance to underscore the need for precise terminology, and advocates a staged dual-track writing practice while preserving established legal and standards titles.

Significance. If the core assumption holds, the proposal could strengthen the examinability of scientific arguments and risk communication in Chinese technical discourse, especially in domains requiring safety-security co-assurance. The manuscript earns credit for grounding its distinctions in external standards and prior literature rather than ad-hoc invention, providing a clear framework for terminological governance.

major comments (2)
  1. [Survey of standards and analysis of effects] The central claim that single-term usage of 'anquan' produces material conceptual compression affecting standards interpretation and engineering practice lacks concrete instances. No specific clause from GB/T standards, ISO equivalents, or other documents is cited where the term leads to divergent expert readings or downstream errors (see the survey and analysis sections).
  2. [Effects on functional safety, SOTIF, and AI governance] The qualitative assessment of impacts on functional safety, SOTIF, and AI governance remains unquantified; the paper does not supply case studies or documented examples demonstrating that context and surrounding technical language fail to recover the intended distinction (see the sections on effects and AI assurance).
minor comments (2)
  1. [Proposal for staged writing practice] Clarify the exact scope of the proposed dual-track practice (e.g., which document types fall under scholarly vs. legal retention) to avoid ambiguity in implementation guidance.
  2. Ensure all Chinese terms are accompanied by pinyin and English glosses on first use for accessibility to non-Chinese readers.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 1 unresolved

We thank the referee for the constructive comments on our manuscript. We address each major comment below, clarifying our approach while agreeing to strengthen specific aspects of the evidence in revision.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: The central claim that single-term usage of 'anquan' produces material conceptual compression affecting standards interpretation and engineering practice lacks concrete instances. No specific clause from GB/T standards, ISO equivalents, or other documents is cited where the term leads to divergent expert readings or downstream errors (see the survey and analysis sections).

    Authors: We acknowledge that citing explicit clauses would make the compression claim more tangible. The current survey section delineates boundaries across GB/T 22239, ISO 26262, and ISO/SAE 21434 but stops short of quoting specific ambiguous passages. In the revised manuscript we will insert direct quotations from GB/T 22239-2019 clause 6.2 and ISO 26262-1:2018 clause 3.1.1, showing how 'anquan' is applied to both non-adversarial and adversarial harms within the same normative text, thereby illustrating the interpretive risk. revision: yes

  2. Referee: The qualitative assessment of impacts on functional safety, SOTIF, and AI governance remains unquantified; the paper does not supply case studies or documented examples demonstrating that context and surrounding technical language fail to recover the intended distinction (see the sections on effects and AI assurance).

    Authors: The manuscript is a terminological proposal grounded in conceptual analysis and co-assurance literature rather than an empirical study; therefore it does not claim to quantify error rates. We will add two short illustrative vignettes drawn from automotive cybersecurity standards language to show how surrounding context can still leave the safety-security boundary under-specified. We cannot, however, supply publicly documented real-world failures whose root cause is provably terminological alone. revision: partial

standing simulated objections not resolved
  • Supplying documented, publicly attributable case studies in which terminological overlap of 'anquan' is shown to be the direct cause of engineering errors or miscommunication, as no such isolated instances appear in the open literature.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity; terminological proposal grounded in external standards and literature

full rationale

The paper advances a recommendation for distinguishing 'anquan' (safety) from 'anbao' (security) in Chinese technical writing. It surveys conceptual boundaries in international and Chinese standards (e.g., functional safety, SOTIF, cybersecurity), references prior work on AI assurance and safety-security co-assurance, and proposes a dual-track writing practice. No equations, fitted parameters, self-definitional reductions, or load-bearing self-citations appear. The central claim is a normative proposal for clarity in risk communication, not a result derived from its own inputs by construction. External standards distinctions and cited literature provide independent grounding, so the argument does not reduce to renaming or self-reference.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The proposal rests on the domain assumption that terminological precision directly supports examinable scientific arguments and better risk communication; no free parameters or invented entities are introduced.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Precise terminology is fundamental to scientific arguments that can be examined, challenged and communicated.
    Invoked when linking terminology to AI assurance and security-informed safety.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5518 in / 1063 out tokens · 41138 ms · 2026-05-15T06:04:01.689909+00:00 · methodology

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Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

64 extracted references · 64 canonical work pages

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