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arxiv: 2606.11145 · v1 · pith:TS6VNE6Xnew · submitted 2026-06-09 · 💻 cs.CR

OpenPCC: Open and Confidential LLM Serving on Commodity TEEs

Haoling Zhou (1) , Shixuan Zhao (1) , Chao Wang (1) , Zhiqiang Lin (1) ((1) The Ohio State University) This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-06-27 12:27 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR
keywords confidential computingtrusted execution environmentsLLM inferencecloud securityopen sourceprivacy protectionvLLMTEE
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The pith

OpenPCC enables confidential LLM cloud serving on commodity TEEs without proprietary hardware.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper identifies the need for open, secure cloud inference services that protect sensitive user data in LLM applications. It proposes OpenPCC, a framework using standard trusted execution environments to achieve confidentiality in an open-source manner. A prototype is built and tested on Llama-3 8B with vLLM, separating the framework's costs from TEE hardware. This approach addresses limitations in existing proprietary solutions like Apple PCC, which cannot be adopted broadly and have design issues. Demonstrating feasibility means others can implement similar private AI services on available hardware.

Core claim

We present OpenPCC, a Confidential CIS framework that does not rely on proprietary hardware but instead uses commercially available TEEs. We implement an open-source prototype and characterize it end-to-end on a Llama-3 8B vLLM workload, separating OpenPCC's own cost from the underlying TEE hardware. Our analysis and evaluation demonstrated the feasibility and security of the system.

What carries the argument

OpenPCC framework for enforcing confidentiality and isolation in LLM inference using commodity TEEs.

Load-bearing premise

Commodity TEEs deliver the required privacy protection for LLM inference without design glitches, and the open-source implementation correctly enforces isolation and confidentiality.

What would settle it

Discovery of a data leak or isolation failure in the OpenPCC prototype running the Llama-3 workload would falsify the security and feasibility claims.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2606.11145 by Chao Wang (1), Haoling Zhou (1), Shixuan Zhao (1), Zhiqiang Lin (1) ((1) The Ohio State University).

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: OpenPcc components and the trust boundary around the inference node. key stays in the CVM, while the public key is committed into a composite attestation token that covers both TEEs, a tech￾nique which we discuss later in subsection 4.1. User prompts and completions are decrypted only inside this boundary, addressing P1, and the per-request user data, including KV￾cache entries, is wiped before the respons… view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: OpenPcc workflow, showing how the parties in￾teract in an inference session. public key is the only credential the node advertises. Llama-3 8B [25] is served by vLLM 0.8.5+ [41] inside the same VM. The inference node does not implement attestation logic itself. Instead, on every attestation request it invokes Intel’s Trust Authority Client [18], which collects the TDX quote through ConfigFS-TSM, collects t… view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: OpenPcc trust pipeline microbenchmark. (a) Per-request operations paid on every inference. (b) Session setup paid once per attestation report cache TTL. Methodology. For the end-to-end Llama-3 8B workload shown in subsection 6.3, every data point is the median over 50 measurement requests after a 10-request warm-up. We report both p50 (the typical case) and p99 (the slow tail case) wherever a tail matters.… view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: p50 TTFT across the 4×4 prompt×batch matrix at 128-token completions. (a) Plain served with gRPC, gateway, and no TEEs. (b) Full OpenPcc stack. A cell in (b) shows both the absolute TTFT and the percentage increase relative to the plain served configuration. Includes the gateway hop, AES-GCM round-trip, GPU prefill, and the first decode step. • Decode throughput (tokens/s): steady-state throughput of the r… view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Llama-3 8B p50 decode throughput across all three configurations. the gateway. Service-provider/platform-operator collusion is folded into the platform-operator case because it does not give the attacker any capability that the silicon roots do not already mediate. Side channels and denial of service are out of scope per subsection 3.4. 7.1 Malicious Service Provider P1 and P2 mentioned in subsection 3.3 r… view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Generative AI applications such as personal AI agents, image generators, and chat assistants offer advanced capabilities to improve user experience. Behind the scenes, Large Language Models (LLMs) that power these services require a massive amount of computation and are usually deployed in the cloud, available as APIs, meaning that a user's request has to be sent to a Cloud Inference Service (CIS) for processing. However, the strong capabilities of LLM also mean that user's requests now contain much more personal sensitive or enterprise confidential information, demanding equally strong protection in CIS. While early industry efforts such as Apple Private Cloud Compute (PCC) and Google Private AI Compute have emerged to show the potential of secure CIS, they are not adoptable for deployment by others due to their reliance on proprietary hardware and closed ecosystem. In addition, they all suffer from their own design glitches that can undermine the ambitious goal of bringing in true privacy protection to end users. In this paper, we present our analysis of the fundamental requirements of building a secure yet open CIS. We then present OpenPCC, a Confidential CIS framework that does not rely on proprietary hardware but instead uses commercially available TEEs. We implement an open-source prototype and characterize it end-to-end on a Llama-3 8B vLLM workload, separating OpenPCC's own cost from the underlying TEE hardware. Our analysis and evaluation demonstrated the feasibility and security of the system.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

3 major / 1 minor

Summary. The paper introduces OpenPCC, a framework for confidential cloud inference services (CIS) for LLMs that relies on commodity TEEs rather than proprietary hardware. It analyzes fundamental requirements for secure open CIS, implements an open-source prototype, and evaluates it end-to-end on a Llama-3 8B vLLM workload while separating OpenPCC overhead from underlying TEE costs, claiming that the analysis and evaluation demonstrate feasibility and security.

Significance. If the security and isolation properties are rigorously established, the work would provide a practical, auditable alternative to closed systems such as Apple Private Cloud Compute, enabling broader deployment of privacy-preserving LLM inference on standard hardware and addressing a key barrier to confidential AI services.

major comments (3)
  1. [Abstract] The abstract asserts that 'analysis and evaluation demonstrated the feasibility and security of the system,' yet the provided description supplies no quantitative security metrics, threat-model coverage, or experimental evidence of isolation (e.g., side-channel resistance or attestation results); this leaves the central security claim unsupported by visible data.
  2. [Evaluation] The evaluation on the Llama-3 8B vLLM workload separates OpenPCC cost from TEE hardware but does not report targeted checks for cache-timing, page-fault, or integration side channels that would confirm confinement of model weights, KV cache, prompts, and outputs inside the TEE boundary under realistic inference traffic.
  3. [Security Analysis] The claim that commodity TEEs avoid the design glitches identified in proprietary systems is asserted without a concrete mapping of those glitches to the chosen TEEs or a verification that the open-source integration correctly enforces the required isolation properties for the full vLLM stack.
minor comments (1)
  1. Notation for TEE-specific overhead components should be defined consistently across text and figures to improve readability.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

3 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the detailed and constructive feedback. We address each major comment below with clarifications from the manuscript and indicate the revisions we will make.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract] The abstract asserts that 'analysis and evaluation demonstrated the feasibility and security of the system,' yet the provided description supplies no quantitative security metrics, threat-model coverage, or experimental evidence of isolation (e.g., side-channel resistance or attestation results); this leaves the central security claim unsupported by visible data.

    Authors: We agree the abstract phrasing is too strong. The security argument rests on the requirements analysis (Section 3) showing how commodity TEEs satisfy the isolation and attestation properties needed for confidential CIS, together with the open prototype that places the full vLLM stack inside the TEE. No new quantitative side-channel or attestation experiments were performed; the evaluation measures only performance overhead. We will revise the abstract to read that the analysis and evaluation demonstrate feasibility, with security properties inherited from the chosen TEEs. This change will be made. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Evaluation] The evaluation on the Llama-3 8B vLLM workload separates OpenPCC cost from TEE hardware but does not report targeted checks for cache-timing, page-fault, or integration side channels that would confirm confinement of model weights, KV cache, prompts, and outputs inside the TEE boundary under realistic inference traffic.

    Authors: The evaluation (Section 5) deliberately isolates OpenPCC software overhead from TEE hardware cost on the Llama-3 8B workload; it does not include new side-channel measurements. Confinement is enforced by the TEE boundary and its attestation, which we treat as given under the standard TEE threat model. We will add a short discussion subsection that enumerates the relevant side-channel vectors (cache timing, page faults) and explains why they are outside the OpenPCC threat model once the model and KV cache reside inside the enclave. Full empirical side-channel testing remains outside the scope of this paper, so the revision will be partial. revision: partial

  3. Referee: [Security Analysis] The claim that commodity TEEs avoid the design glitches identified in proprietary systems is asserted without a concrete mapping of those glitches to the chosen TEEs or a verification that the open-source integration correctly enforces the required isolation properties for the full vLLM stack.

    Authors: Section 4 presents a requirements-driven comparison that identifies specific glitches in closed systems (e.g., limited auditability, hardware lock-in) and shows how commodity TEEs plus open attestation address them. A more explicit mapping was omitted for brevity. We will insert a concise table that links each cited proprietary glitch to the corresponding commodity-TEE mechanism and will add a paragraph clarifying the vLLM integration points that keep weights, KV cache, and I/O inside the enclave. These additions will be included in the revision. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: claims rest on new design, implementation, and evaluation

full rationale

The paper describes analysis of CIS requirements, followed by presentation of OpenPCC using commodity TEEs, an open-source prototype, and end-to-end characterization on Llama-3 8B vLLM (separating OpenPCC overhead from TEE cost). No equations, fitted parameters, predictions, or self-citations appear as load-bearing elements in the abstract or described structure. The central claims derive from the implemented system and measurements rather than reducing to inputs by construction. This is a standard systems paper with independent empirical content.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 0 axioms · 0 invented entities

Based solely on the abstract; no free parameters, axioms, or invented entities are identifiable or required for the high-level claim.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.1-grok · 5803 in / 1136 out tokens · 26115 ms · 2026-06-27T12:27:14.343340+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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