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REVIEW 3 major objections 6 minor 152 references

Wanting to Be Understood Explains the Meta-Problem of Consciousness

T0 review · 3 major / 6 minor · reviewed 2026-08-07 · deepseek-v4-flash

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Pith's one-line read The hard problem of consciousness persists because our drive to be understood collides with the severe compression of language, leaving a residue that feels ineffable.

desk verdict A genuinely new social-motivation account of the meta-problem, but the load-bearing step from 'wanting to be understood' to 'demanding perfect reproduction of experience' is stipulated, not derived. read the letter →

arxiv 2506.12086 v1 pith:4H5G44NX submitted 2025-06-10 q-bio.NC cs.AI

Chrisantha Fernando , Dylan Banarse , Simon Osindero This is my paper
classification q-bio.NCcs.AI
keywords consciousnessmeta-problemofhardproblemexternalrepresentationssharedintentionalityaccessineffabilitybandwidth
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

This paper tries to solve the meta-problem of consciousness—the puzzle of why humans think there is a hard problem of consciousness at all. Its answer is that humans evolved a species-unique motivation to be understood, and that motivation drove the invention of public external representations such as mime, language, and art. These public symbols are, on the paper's account, a precondition for access consciousness, the reportable global availability of information for reasoning and control. Because conscious report is a low-bandwidth channel compared with the richness of raw experience, every public symbol under-samples what it denotes; the authors argue that our craving for perfect mutual understanding inflates this ordinary compression loss into a felt 'explanatory gap.' The payoff is that the hard problem can be treated as a social-cognitive side effect of bandwidth limits plus social motivation, rather than as evidence for a nonphysical explanatory gap.

What carries the argument

The argument turns on three linked components. (1) An intrinsic motivation for shared intentionality—a 'wanting to be understood' by others—posited as species-unique and biologically canalised; it is the causal engine that makes humans coin public symbols. (2) External representations ('consciousness technologies') such as gesture, writing, and diagrams, which the paper identifies as the enabling technology of access consciousness, the global availability of information for reasoning. (3) A bandwidth mismatch quantified as roughly $10$ megabits per second of raw visual input against a few hundred bits per second of conscious report, so every word, image, or gesture under-samples the experience it denotes. The operative move is the contrast between an explanation that lets an audience 'grasp' a pattern and one that would require reliving the experience; the paper claims the motivation to be understood inflates the demand from the first to the second, and that inflation is what produces the felt ineffability.

What would settle it

A decisive test: find a person with intact perception, memory, and language but a selectively abolished motivation to be understood—for example, after a neurological lesion that removes social reward—and ask whether experiences still feel ineffable. The theory predicts the hard-problem puzzlement should fade as the social motivation fades; if such a person still reports that the feel of red overflows every explanation, the inflated-demand mechanism is falsified. A complementary manipulation would raise the motivation in a controlled setting and measure whether the experienced explanatory gap grows.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

On the paper's own terms, the central discovery is that the felt ineffability of experience—the sense that no physical explanation captures what red looks like or what pain feels like—is not a sign of an explanatory gap in nature but a predictable collision between two human facts: a species-unique drive to have inner states understood by others, and the tiny bandwidth of the public symbols through which understanding must be achieved. Access consciousness, the reportable layer of thought, was bootstrapped by external representations, so 'to be consciously aware is to strive to have one's agency understood by oneself and others.' The authors stress that this does not resolve the ontological hard problem; it explains why creatures like us are permanently dissatisfied with every candidate physical story and keep re-raising the hard problem. The residue that feels ineffable is an irreducible leftover of sensorimotor richness after compression, not a nonphysical quality.

Load-bearing premise

The load-bearing premise is that humans have a biologically built-in, species-unique craving to be understood by others, strong enough to have driven the invention of language and other public symbols, and not merely a general drive to predict or reduce uncertainty.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • The hard-problem intuitions—qualia, the explanatory gap, the conceivability of zombies—are predicted consequences of a high-bandwidth sensory stream meeting a low-bandwidth public language; they do not indicate nonphysical phenomenal facts.
  • Because external representations are a precondition for access consciousness, each new representational technology (writing, diagrams, digital media) should expand what can be consciously accessed and reported; the paper cites its own archaeological-computational analysis as evidence of this pattern.
  • The drive to be understood guarantees that humans will keep inventing new communicative forms—art, metaphor, science—rather than settling on a final vocabulary for inner experience.
  • In artificial agents, an auxiliary 'be-understood' reward should produce decodable emergent communication, and the resulting codes should remain compressed, so such agents would show the same residue of ineffability when asked to explain their own internal states.
  • The paper does not claim to close the ontological hard problem; it offers a meta-explanation of why we keep asking, and that explanation can stand or fall independently of whether experience is physical.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • I would extend this into a testable prediction: reported ineffability should track the current strength of the speaker's motivation to be understood—higher after social exclusion, lower when communication is purely instrumental—a correlation the paper does not itself assert.
  • A further extension is that any sufficiently rich embodied agent with a social drive should exhibit the same compression residue; a machine rewarded for being understood should eventually say things like 'I cannot fully convey what that looked like' even if it has no phenomenal experience, which would support the social-engine story over a phenomenal one.
  • The paper's bandwidth comparison uses global figures, the whole optic nerve against the whole report channel; a sharper test would quantify the sensorimotor contingencies that constitute one specific experience, which could narrow or widen the measured gap and make the account quantitatively checkable.
  • If this account is right, whether an explanation of consciousness can ever feel complete is not a fact about the limits of science but about the motivational state of the audience, a reframing with direct consequences for how consciousness is taught and communicated.
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Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

3 major / 6 minor

Summary. The paper proposes a social-communicative solution to the meta-problem of consciousness. It argues that humans possess a species-unique intrinsic motivation to be understood, which drove the cultural invention of external representations (mime, language, art). These external representations are claimed to be a precondition for access consciousness, whose bandwidth is far lower than the richness of phenomenal experience. Consequently, no external representation can reproduce that richness, and although ordinary explanations only need let an audience 'grasp' a pattern, the drive to be understood inflates the epistemic demand so that explanations of experience feel unsatisfactory. This inflated demand, rather than a metaphysical gap, is said to explain why the hard problem persists. The paper is interdisciplinary, drawing on attachment theory, comparative psychology, bandwidth estimates, cultural evolution, and recent interpretable-ML work, and it explicitly disclaims any resolution of the ontological hard problem.

Significance. If the central causal chain were established, the paper would offer a genuinely novel and testable reframing of the meta-problem: hard-problem intuitions would be a byproduct of a species-unique social motivation colliding with the bandwidth limits of public representation. The bandwidth figures are well sourced, and the proposal that external representations scaffold access consciousness is given a plausible developmental and archaeological gloss. The paper also makes a concrete, falsifiable move by suggesting an implementation path through multi-agent reinforcement learning with a 'be-understood' reward, which is a strength. However, the load-bearing connection between the social motive and the inflated epistemic norm is asserted rather than derived, and the ineffability claim is close to definitional; as it stands, the account risks collapsing into a restatement of bandwidth limits without explaining the specifically normative character of the hard-problem intuition.

major comments (3)
  1. [§1] The central step from 'wanting to be understood' to the inflated epistemic norm is stipulated, not derived. The evidence cited in §1 and §5 (Gricean cooperativeness, joint attention, dialogue coordination, attachment) supports wanting to be understood well enough to coordinate, not wanting another to re-live one's experience. The paper itself concedes in §7 that ordinary explanations need only let an audience 'grasp the relevant pattern, not relive the phenomenon' (citing Potochnik). The move to 'total and perfect communicative union' is then introduced with 'We propose it is our intrinsic motivation ... which makes us behave so unreasonably' — a stipulation. Without an argument for why phenomenal experience uniquely triggers a demand for reproduction rather than grasping, the account reduces to 'experience is high-bandwidth, language is low-bandwidth, hence ineffability,' which is a restatement of the target intuition rather than an explanation of its normative force. A concrete test would be to specify why other high-bandwidth private expertise (wine tasting, chess intuition, athletic skill) does not generate a comparable 'hard problem' discourse.
  2. [§1] The species-unique intrinsic motivation to be understood is posited rather than established. 'We suggest that humans evolved an intrinsic motivation for shared intensionality through the Baldwin effect' and 'We hypothesise a biologically grounded “understanding-monitor”' are the only supports for the motivational engine. The comparative evidence (apes do not invent symbols for inner states) is equivocal: it may reflect a lack of the relevant cognitive machinery rather than a lack of motivation. Since the entire causal story depends on this motive, the manuscript needs either direct evidence for the motive's existence and species-uniqueness or a falsifiable prediction that could distinguish the motivation-based account from a mere competence-based account. As written, the evidential basis is too thin for a load-bearing premise.
  3. [§3–4] The ineffability half of the argument is close to definitional and does not by itself deliver the conclusion. If external representations are defined as finite, lossy, public codes, then it follows by construction that they cannot reproduce the full richness of experience; the 'residue that feels ineffable' is then named rather than explained. The claim in §3 that 'we will never be able to predict an experience of red perfectly' conflates prediction with reproduction: a complete physical prediction of a perceptual state does not require re-instantiating that state. Thus the paper's own framework shows that the gap between grasping and reproducing is not the same as a gap in explanation. The load-bearing work is done by the inflated norm flagged in the first major comment; absent that norm, the bandwidth argument is a restatement of ineffability, not an explanation of the meta-problem.
minor comments (6)
  1. [Abstract] The closing sentence 'to be consciously aware is to strive to have one's agency understood by oneself and others' is presented as a definitional claim, but the paper only argues for a specific connection between access consciousness and external representations; this sentence should be qualified or framed as a slogan, not a definition.
  2. [§1] There is a typo: 'Psycholinguistic shows that speakers spontaneously tailor utterances' should be 'Psycholinguistic research shows' or 'Psycholinguistic studies show'.
  3. [§2] The phrase 'co-occides' is a misspelling of 'co-occurs'.
  4. [Figure 1] Figure 1 is visually dense and the caption is long; the connection between the figure's hierarchical SMC layers and the bandwidth argument in the text is not clearly explained. A simpler schematic with explicit arrows showing the compression from high-bandwidth SMCs to low-bandwidth public symbols would make the core claim easier to evaluate.
  5. [§5, footnote 2] The lengthy footnote on the cultural history of the zombie figure, while interesting, is tangential to the argument and substantially interrupts the discussion of the zombie thought experiment. It should be shortened or moved to an appendix.
  6. [References] The reference list has several formatting inconsistencies: 'multiple' is used as an author for the Bible entry, some entries have stray punctuation such as 'p.,364', and the Sturluson entry lacks a publisher. A careful copyedit of the references is needed.

Circularity Check

3 steps flagged · score 5.0 of 10

The terminal link is circular by construction: 'ineffability' is defined as the lossy residue of external representations and then cited as the cause of the hard-problem intuition, while the perfectionist demand that would make the puzzlement persist is posited, not derived; the earlier social-evolutionary links retain independent support.

  1. self definitional [Section 4 (Puzzlement), paragraph beginning 'We propose that the feeling of ineffability...'; echoed in Sections 3 and 7.]
    "We propose that the feeling of ineffability about the phenomenal arises because of the inevitable leftover—the residue of our sensorimotor stream—that cannot be accurately predicted or compressed by words, but which we nonetheless attend to in order to build better shared external representations (e.g. new terms for nuanced varieties of 'red') (Landman et al., 2003; O'regan and Noë, 2001)."

    External representations are defined in Section 2 as low-bandwidth public codes that cannot recapitulate the high-bandwidth sensorimotor stream ('linguistic judgement can point to that feel but never fully substitute for it'), so an uncompressed 'residue' exists by definition. The paper then offers that residue as its explanation of the meta-problem: the feeling of ineffability is caused by the leftover that cannot be compressed into words. But 'ineffable' just means not capturable in words, so this step re-describes the bandwidth difference as its own cause. The hard-problem intuition that experience 'outruns' description is equated with the by-construction fact that codes under-sample experience.

  2. fitted input called prediction [Section 7 (Conclusion), final two paragraphs, especially 'Against this backdrop, our demand...'.]
    "Against this backdrop, our demand that explanations also conjure the qualitative feel of experience looks misplaced: the explanation should have been complete when it earned its explanatory role in discourse. We propose it is our intrinsic motivation which seeks total and perfect communicative union with another which makes us behave so unreasonably in this regard."

    The evidence marshalled in Section 5 (attachment, joint attention, still-face, Grice, brain-to-brain coupling) supports wanting to be understood well enough to coordinate, and Section 7 itself concedes that ordinary explanation needs only to let an audience 'grasp a pattern, not reproduce the experience' (Potochnik). The escalation to demanding that explanations 'conjure the qualitative feel' is the only premise that makes the hard problem persist; it is stipulated ('We propose'), and its content is the hard-problem intuition itself converted into a norm: the puzzlement is explained by an expectation whose frustration just is the puzzlement.

1 more flagged steps
  1. self citation load bearing [Sections 1-2, with reinforcement in Sections 6-7; key sentences citing Fernando et al. 2024.]
    "We suggest it is this motivation for wanting to be understood, which results in us having the above intuitions about the hard problem of consciousness (Fernando et al., 2024). ... Our own archaeological-computational analysis shows that each major expansion of representational media—from Acheulean marks to digital code—co-occides with new layers of metacognitive report and self-regulation, consistent with the view that external representations are the enabling technology of access consciousness (Fernando et al., 2024)."

    The paper's central causal arrow (the motivation 'results in us having the above intuitions about the hard problem') and the premise that external representations are a precondition of access consciousness are referred to the authors' own prior publications rather than demonstrated in this manuscript; the archaeological-computational analysis is cited, not reproduced. This is load-bearing for the evolutionary origin of the motivation and for the media-expansion co-occurrence claim. Mitigating: the argument does not rest solely on these citations—Tomasello, attachment research, Vygotsky, Kirsh and Maglio, and the Sacks case provide external support—so this step contributes partial rather than complete circularity.

full rationale

The derivation chain has four links: (i) humans possess a species-unique intrinsic motivation to be understood; (ii) this drove the invention of external representations, which are preconditions for access consciousness; (iii) language and access consciousness have far lower bandwidth than raw experience; (iv) motivation plus bandwidth gap makes demands for explanations of experience permanently unsatisfiable, so the hard problem persists. Links (i)-(iii) are argued with substantial independent evidence (Tomasello; attachment and joint-attention studies; Gricean pragmatics; Vygotsky; Kirsh and Maglio; Marr; Koch and Tsuchiya; Landman et al.) and are not circular: the motivation is evidenced by developmental and comparative data rather than defined by the meta-problem, and the access-consciousness claim is supported by suppression experiments and extended-mind literature. The circularity is in link (iv). In Section 4, the feeling of ineffability is defined as the by-construction leftover of a lossy public code and then presented as the explanation of the hard-problem intuition; since 'ineffable' means not capturable in words, this restates the phenomenon as its own cause. In Section 7, the crucial escalation from wanting to be understood at grasp-level to demanding that explanations 'conjure the qualitative feel' is stipulated ('We propose'), and the paper itself calls the resulting behavior 'unreasonable' and 'misplaced'; the central prediction that the hard problem is permanent is entailed by positing an unsatisfiable demand, so the output is built into the input. The self-citations to Fernando et al. 2024 and 2025 carry the evolutionary-origin and access-consciousness-precondition claims but are buttressed by external literature, so they affect the score only modestly. The paper honestly fences off the ontological hard problem (Sections 5 and 7), which is a scope limitation rather than circularity. Overall: partial circularity—the terminal link reduces by construction, while the social-evolutionary narrative retains genuine independent content.

Assumptions & free parameters 0 free parameters · 5 assumptions · 1 invented entities

The central argument rests on a small set of posited psychological and information-theoretic premises rather than on numeric free parameters. The most important is the species-unique motivation to be understood, which is assumed and then used to explain the drive to create external representations. The information-theoretic premise about lossy compression is standard math once finite symbols are assumed. The 'understanding-monitor' is the only clearly invented mechanistic entity, and it is explicitly labeled a hypothesis.

assumptions (5)
  • domain assumption Humans possess a species-unique intrinsic motivation to be understood, evolved through the Baldwin effect.
    Section 1 posits this motivation and treats it as the engine of the whole account. It is supported by developmental and comparative citations, but it is not directly measured and remains the load-bearing premise.
  • domain assumption External representations are a precondition for access consciousness.
    Section 2 argues this from Vygotsky, Kirsh and Maglio, and extended-mind theses, but it is a substantive claim about the architecture of consciousness that is not established by the cited work alone.
  • standard math Any finite external representation under-samples the sensorimotor manifold it denotes.
    This follows from information theory given finite symbolic codes and high-bandwidth sensory input, and it underlies the ineffability argument in Sections 3 and 4.
  • ad hoc to paper The motivation to be understood inflates epistemic demands so that no explanation of experience can feel satisfactory.
    Section 7 invokes 'our intrinsic motivation which seeks total and perfect communicative union with another' to explain why we are not satisfied with ordinary explanations. This is a posited psychological disposition tailored to explain the target phenomenon.
  • domain assumption The bandwidth estimates used in Section 3 are adequate proxies for phenomenal capacity versus access capacity.
    The paper relies on Marr's optic nerve estimate and Koch and Tsuchiya's report bandwidth without error bars or discussion of the contested nature of these measures. If these estimates are not comparable, the claimed order-of-magnitude gap is weakened.
invented entities (1)
  • understanding-monitor
    purpose: A hypothesized biologically grounded reward signal that monitors whether one has been understood, shaping conversational behavior and driving the externalization of inner states.
    Section 1 says 'We therefore hypothesise a biologically grounded understanding-monitor whose feedback shapes conversational behaviour.' The cited neural coupling and multi-agent mutual-information rewards are indirect evidence, not direct support for this specific construct.

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Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Wanting to Be Understood Explains the Meta-Problem of Consciousness." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/4H5G44NX

@misc{pith2026250612086,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Wanting to Be Understood Explains the Meta-Problem of Consciousness},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/4H5G44NX}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2506.12086}
}
read the original abstract

Because we are highly motivated to be understood, we created public external representations -- mime, language, art -- to externalise our inner states. We argue that such external representations are a pre-condition for access consciousness, the global availability of information for reasoning. Yet the bandwidth of access consciousness is tiny compared with the richness of `raw experience', so no external representation can reproduce that richness in full. Ordinarily an explanation of experience need only let an audience `grasp' the relevant pattern, not relive the phenomenon. But our drive to be understood, and our low level sensorimotor capacities for `grasping' so rich, that the demand for an explanation of the feel of experience cannot be ``satisfactory''. That inflated epistemic demand (the preeminence of our expectation that we could be perfectly understood by another or ourselves) rather than an irreducible metaphysical gulf -- keeps the hard problem of consciousness alive. But on the plus side, it seems we will simply never give up creating new ways to communicate and think about our experiences. In this view, to be consciously aware is to strive to have one's agency understood by oneself and others.

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Pith tools

Reviewed August 7, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.