REVIEW 2 cited by
Poisoning Attacks and Defenses in Recommender Systems: A Survey
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
read the original abstract
Modern recommender systems (RS) have profoundly enhanced user experience across digital platforms, yet they face significant threats from poisoning attacks. These attacks, aimed at manipulating recommendation outputs for unethical gains, exploit vulnerabilities in RS through injecting malicious data or intervening model training. This survey presents a unique perspective by examining these threats through the lens of an attacker, offering fresh insights into their mechanics and impacts. Concretely, we detail a systematic pipeline that encompasses four stages of a poisoning attack: setting attack goals, assessing attacker capabilities, analyzing victim architecture, and implementing poisoning strategies. The pipeline not only aligns with various attack tactics but also serves as a comprehensive taxonomy to pinpoint focuses of distinct poisoning attacks. Correspondingly, we further classify defensive strategies into two main categories: poisoning data filtering and robust training from the defender's perspective. Finally, we highlight existing limitations and suggest innovative directions for further exploration in this field.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
-
Attacking and Defending Multi-Agent Collaborative Filtering Systems Through Connectivity
In agent-based collaborative filtering, attack spread and privacy leakage grow with interaction connectivity, but the effect is asymmetric between user and item agents and differs between early and steady-state phases.
-
VENOMREC: Cross-Modal Interactive Poisoning for Targeted Promotion in Multimodal LLM Recommender Systems
Synchronized text+image poisoning steers multimodal LLM recommenders to promote target items, reaching 0.73 mean exposure@20.
Discussion (0). Sign in to comment.