Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types

As of 16 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 37 of 37 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2506.15887.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2506.15887 v1

Coverage vector

measured 37 of 37 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.159851Z

measured 37 of 37 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

37 of 37 outbound references displayed

verified exact6
verified fuzzy11
unresolved19
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier1
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 5e250fac-b233-47eb-ba94-fce349eb6bdb · outbound

This paper cites Albrecht, Filippos Christianos, and Lukas Schäfer.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Albrecht, Filippos Christianos, and Lukas Schäfer

Reference 1

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.769211Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 8f3cba85-bcf8-45ce-88af-cde7d3c7c6b4 · outbound

This paper cites Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty

Reference 2

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.010552Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 3507cde4-1508-408c-bd8f-813556ac0885 · outbound

This paper cites Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort

Reference 3

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.581961Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 1c3f0e67-287e-47fc-9e83-cd8b517f913a · outbound

This paper cites Combinatorial agency.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Combinatorial agency

Reference 4

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.756492Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 64c99b1e-f83d-4e89-8ff2-b83dabe18923 · outbound

This paper cites Adaptive Mechanism Design: Learning to Promote Cooperation.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Adaptive Mechanism Design: Learning to Promote Cooperation

Reference 5

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.563604Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 2169bd75-e99e-4fa0-8326-c3893af2d58c · outbound

This paper cites Contract theory.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Contract theory

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.742982Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation a51dec1e-a5f9-40c0-8d8c-aeefbe329d45 · outbound

This paper cites Handbook of Computational Social Choice.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Handbook of Computational Social Choice

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.729658Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation b0918223-7287-4ada-991f-892e8c738428 · outbound

This paper cites Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization

Reference 8

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.545917Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 33ca6f3f-9e44-443f-8d82-50d75c70952c · outbound

This paper cites Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcomes.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcomes

Reference 9

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.716639Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation e9d92701-f6e9-4a0c-b074-2dc2f19ad0cf · outbound

This paper cites AI-driven Prices for Externalities and Sustainability in Production Markets.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types AI-driven Prices for Externalities and Sustainability in Production Markets

Reference 10

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.527112Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 5f9e7ffb-6bcb-4bdf-bdb4-b2ac3ffbc119 · outbound

This paper cites Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Estimating and Incentivizing Imperfect-Knowledge Agents with Hidden Rewards

Reference 11

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.050260Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation e65a9ead-0e87-4635-9a43-a5b7001469e8 · outbound

This paper cites Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents

Reference 12

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.054598Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 176bd630-2e8e-41ab-aaf8-9374bbc259af · outbound

This paper cites Fairness Through Awareness.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Fairness Through Awareness

Reference 13

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.058847Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 0406518b-8e92-4b69-b572-07b96caf1c00 · outbound

This paper cites Multi-Agent Contracts, November 2022.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Multi-Agent Contracts, November 2022

Reference 14

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.466097Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation b126b2e7-e6a6-46c3-8a2d-efd7ca382cd1 · outbound

This paper cites Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts

Reference 15

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.067014Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 00732234-e91b-48d3-b3dc-23004235d15f · outbound

This paper cites Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey

Reference 16

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.071186Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 3dc40958-3c03-4655-8ad2-4cc91d04879c · outbound

This paper cites Simple versus Optimal Contracts.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Simple versus Optimal Contracts

Reference 17

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.702904Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 85dab8f2-bfd7-4c42-a2fc-29648bc39e37 · outbound

This paper cites The Complexity of Contracts.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types The Complexity of Contracts

Reference 18

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.362063Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation bd0f28bd-cc19-48fe-b23a-20a88e3547a6 · outbound

This paper cites Fairness and Contract Design.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Fairness and Contract Design

Reference 19

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.689596Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 46f3a9ba-9bd9-44d1-b85d-b461ec1a9bc1 · outbound

This paper cites Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness

Reference 20

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.087875Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation da12aa6f-01c8-4536-8f33-9ed2e8b53471 · outbound

This paper cites Contracting with a Learning Agent.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Contracting with a Learning Agent

Reference 21

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.092222Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 3e890e87-4afe-49fc-94a7-bf7e7491f005 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Unresolved cited work

Reference 22

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.675957Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation d1063535-39c8-4fe8-b0e2-95f1beefe9fd · outbound

This paper cites Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertempo- ral Incentives.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertempo- ral Incentives

Reference 23

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.661433Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 1945a607-c8b6-4338-9110-94481c6f0c3d · outbound

This paper cites Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning: A Comprehensive Survey.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning: A Comprehensive Survey

Reference 24

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.104666Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 65a27d89-e9f8-4ef5-8cac-60629d0783cf · outbound

This paper cites Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Orchestrating AI Agents with Contracts.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Orchestrating AI Agents with Contracts

Reference 25

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.108979Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a125462a-c1d3-4342-8673-9c9385053366 · outbound

This paper cites Learning Fairness in Multi-Agent Systems.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Learning Fairness in Multi-Agent Systems

Reference 26

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.113262Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 4b0f8025-f4d4-429f-9518-de7dfdf6e291 · outbound

This paper cites Achieving Fairness in Multi-Agent Markov Decision Processes Using Reinforcement Learning.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Achieving Fairness in Multi-Agent Markov Decision Processes Using Reinforcement Learning

Reference 27

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.117742Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation b7155bd0-b629-466f-8430-3e7aecc790cd · outbound

This paper cites The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model

Reference 28

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.648031Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation c2b6ca23-00e1-4f76-8fc4-940e351631d1 · outbound

This paper cites Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas

Reference 29

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.126496Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 6f161dae-af63-4552-8bfe-3dacf153c7f2 · outbound

This paper cites Algorithmic game theory.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Algorithmic game theory

Reference 30

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.634564Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 25a9df82-60cc-4d50-ae22-a99343fa649b · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Unresolved cited work

Reference 31

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.621636Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation e4a190ab-4877-4f56-8a9e-8b8ce1f60037 · outbound

This paper cites The economics of contracts: a primer.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types The economics of contracts: a primer

Reference 32

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.608881Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.

Observation 8d153045-f445-4694-8fde-817cf5a28029 · outbound

This paper cites Incentivized Learning in Principal-Agent Bandit Games.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Incentivized Learning in Principal-Agent Bandit Games

Reference 33

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.142696Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 80d17d91-c39b-40fa-88f4-d22eecdadeba · outbound

This paper cites Learning to Incentivize Other Learning Agents.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Learning to Incentivize Other Learning Agents

Reference 34

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.146826Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation fccbbd7e-3b76-4161-96cb-c3baa963aba2 · outbound

This paper cites Adaptive Incentive Design with Multi-Agent Meta-Gradient Reinforcement Learning.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Adaptive Incentive Design with Multi-Agent Meta-Gradient Reinforcement Learning

Reference 35

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.151417Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 74501641-be07-4332-b21e-e546cecf37cc · outbound

This paper cites Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: A Selective Overview of Theories and Algorithms.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: A Selective Overview of Theories and Algorithms

Reference 36

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.155588Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 875bc465-3b09-4377-8b37-c36fdc6c3f22 · outbound

This paper cites The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI-Driven Tax Policies.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI-Driven Tax Policies

Reference 37

Resolution: malformed identifier; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.159851Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.