The reviewed record of science sign in
Pith

arxiv: 2204.09136 · v2 · pith:A6QJYRI4 · submitted 2022-04-19 · cs.DS

The White-Box Adversarial Data Stream Model

Reviewed by Pith T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 kernel pith:A6QJYRI4record.jsonopen to challenge →

classification cs.DS
keywords algorithmadversaryalgorithmswhite-boxstreamapproximationdeterministicmodel
0
0 comments X
read the original abstract

We study streaming algorithms in the white-box adversarial model, where the stream is chosen adaptively by an adversary who observes the entire internal state of the algorithm at each time step. We show that nontrivial algorithms are still possible. We first give a randomized algorithm for the $L_1$-heavy hitters problem that outperforms the optimal deterministic Misra-Gries algorithm on long streams. If the white-box adversary is computationally bounded, we use cryptographic techniques to reduce the memory of our $L_1$-heavy hitters algorithm even further and to design a number of additional algorithms for graph, string, and linear algebra problems. The existence of such algorithms is surprising, as the streaming algorithm does not even have a secret key in this model, i.e., its state is entirely known to the adversary. One algorithm we design is for estimating the number of distinct elements in a stream with insertions and deletions achieving a multiplicative approximation and sublinear space; such an algorithm is impossible for deterministic algorithms. We also give a general technique that translates any two-player deterministic communication lower bound to a lower bound for {\it randomized} algorithms robust to a white-box adversary. In particular, our results show that for all $p\ge 0$, there exists a constant $C_p>1$ such that any $C_p$-approximation algorithm for $F_p$ moment estimation in insertion-only streams with a white-box adversary requires $\Omega(n)$ space for a universe of size $n$. Similarly, there is a constant $C>1$ such that any $C$-approximation algorithm in an insertion-only stream for matrix rank requires $\Omega(n)$ space with a white-box adversary. Our algorithmic results based on cryptography thus show a separation between computationally bounded and unbounded adversaries. (Abstract shortened to meet arXiv limits.)

This paper has not been read by Pith yet.

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.