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Signed-Prompt: A New Approach to Prevent Prompt Injection Attacks Against LLM-Integrated Applications
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The critical challenge of prompt injection attacks in Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated applications, a growing concern in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) field. Such attacks, which manipulate LLMs through natural language inputs, pose a significant threat to the security of these applications. Traditional defense strategies, including output and input filtering, as well as delimiter use, have proven inadequate. This paper introduces the 'Signed-Prompt' method as a novel solution. The study involves signing sensitive instructions within command segments by authorized users, enabling the LLM to discern trusted instruction sources. The paper presents a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attack patterns, followed by a detailed explanation of the Signed-Prompt concept, including its basic architecture and implementation through both prompt engineering and fine-tuning of LLMs. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the Signed-Prompt method, showing substantial resistance to various types of prompt injection attacks, thus validating its potential as a robust defense strategy in AI security.
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