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Real AI Agents with Fake Memories: Fatal Context Manipulation Attacks on Web3 Agents

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arxiv 2503.16248 v3 pith:BN226CIX submitted 2025-03-20 cs.CR cs.AI

classification cs.CRcs.AI
keywords agentscontextinjectionattackmanipulationmemoryweb3blockchain
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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AI agents integrated with Web3 offer autonomy and openness but raise security concerns as they interact with financial protocols and immutable smart contracts. This paper investigates the vulnerabilities of AI agents within blockchain-based financial ecosystems when exposed to adversarial threats in real-world scenarios. We introduce the concept of context manipulation -- a comprehensive attack vector that exploits unprotected context surfaces, including input channels, memory modules, and external data feeds. It expands on traditional prompt injection and reveals a more stealthy and persistent threat: memory injection. Using ElizaOS, a representative decentralized AI agent framework for automated Web3 operations, we showcase that malicious injections into prompts or historical records can trigger unauthorized asset transfers and protocol violations which could be financially devastating in reality. To quantify these risks, we introduce CrAIBench, a Web3-focused benchmark covering 150+ realistic blockchain tasks. such as token transfers, trading, bridges, and cross-chain interactions, and 500+ attack test cases using context manipulation. Our evaluation results confirm that AI models are significantly more vulnerable to memory injection compared to prompt injection. Finally, we evaluate a comprehensive defense roadmap, finding that prompt-injection defenses and detectors only provide limited protection when stored context is corrupted, whereas fine-tuning-based defenses substantially reduce attack success rates while preserving performance on single-step tasks. These results underscore the urgent need for AI agents that are both secure and fiduciarily responsible in blockchain environments.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Epistemic Bias Injection: Manipulating LLM Opinion via Selective Context Retrieval

    cs.CR 2025-11 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Factually correct but one-sided passages injected into a RAG database can shift LLM answers toward an attacker's stance, and a PCA/KL-based filter (BiasDef) reduces that shift.

  2. Context manipulation attacks : Web agents are susceptible to corrupted memory

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Web agents with protected prompts can still be hijacked by injecting malicious steps into their stored task plans, reaching up to 63% success on privacy leaks.

  3. Hide-and-Shill: A Reinforcement Learning Framework for Market Manipulation Detection in Symphony-a Decentralized Multi-Agent System

    cs.AI 2025-07 reject novelty 4.0 of 10

    Hide-and-Shill is a multi-agent reinforcement learning detector for DeFi shilling that combines GRPO, LLM features, social graphs, and price reactions, but its reported F1 of 0.90 is not supported by reproducible or i...

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