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SoK: Bitcoin Layer Two (L2)

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arxiv 2409.02650 v1 pith:BZHBSTAG submitted 2024-09-04 cs.CR cs.ET

classification cs.CRcs.ET
keywords bitcoinsolutionsapproachesfirstframeworkinvestigatedlayersecurity
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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We present the first Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on constructing Layer Two (L2) solutions for Bitcoin. We carefully examine a representative subset of ongoing Bitcoin L2 solutions (40 out of 335 extensively investigated cases) and provide a concise yet impactful identification of six classic design patterns through two approaches (i.e., modifying transactions \& creating proofs). Notably, we are the first to incorporate the inscription technology (emerged in mid-2023), along with a series of related innovations. We further establish a reference framework that serves as a baseline criterion ideally suited for evaluating the security aspects of Bitcoin L2 solutions, and which can also be extended to broader L2 applications. We apply this framework to evaluate each of the projects we investigated. We find that the inscription-based approaches introduce new functionality (i.e., programability) to Bitcoin systems, whereas existing proof-based solutions primarily address scalability challenges. Our security analysis reveals new attack vectors targeting data/state (availability, verification), assets (withdrawal, recovery), and users (disputes, censorship).

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. BRC20 Snipping Attack

    cs.CR 2025-01 reject novelty 3.0 of 10

    BRC20 transfers over PSBT are claimed to be front-runnable via higher-fee transaction replacement, but the regtest validation does not actually demonstrate the attack.

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