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From Allies to Adversaries: Manipulating LLM Tool-Calling through Adversarial Injection

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arxiv 2412.10198 v2 pith:G3O6C73I submitted 2024-12-13 cs.CR cs.AI

classification cs.CRcs.AI
keywords tool-callingsystemstooltoolsvulnerabilitiesadversarialattacksdenial-of-service
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Agent-Facing Information Design in LLM Tool Registries

    cs.IR 2026-04 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Legal puffery in tool descriptions fully steers LLM agent selection; disclosure fails, so registries should normalize selection-facing text and show marketing only after choice.

  2. We Should Identify and Mitigate Third-Party Safety Risks in MCP-Powered Agent Systems

    cs.LG 2025-06 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    MCP-powered LLM agents are vulnerable to prompt injection from third-party services, and simple detection or filtering defenses do not reliably stop these attacks.

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