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Adversarial Attacks to Multi-Modal Models

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arxiv 2409.06793 v2 pith:IFZFUVZT submitted 2024-09-10 cs.CR cs.IRcs.LG

classification cs.CRcs.IRcs.LG
keywords crossfiremodelsaudiodownstreamfileimageinputmulti-modal
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Multi-modal models have gained significant attention due to their powerful capabilities. These models effectively align embeddings across diverse data modalities, showcasing superior performance in downstream tasks compared to their unimodal counterparts. Recent study showed that the attacker can manipulate an image or audio file by altering it in such a way that its embedding matches that of an attacker-chosen targeted input, thereby deceiving downstream models. However, this method often underperforms due to inherent disparities in data from different modalities. In this paper, we introduce CrossFire, an innovative approach to attack multi-modal models. CrossFire begins by transforming the targeted input chosen by the attacker into a format that matches the modality of the original image or audio file. We then formulate our attack as an optimization problem, aiming to minimize the angular deviation between the embeddings of the transformed input and the modified image or audio file. Solving this problem determines the perturbations to be added to the original media. Our extensive experiments on six real-world benchmark datasets reveal that CrossFire can significantly manipulate downstream tasks, surpassing existing attacks. Additionally, we evaluate six defensive strategies against CrossFire, finding that current defenses are insufficient to counteract our CrossFire.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Invisible Injections: Exploiting Vision-Language Models Through Steganographic Prompt Embedding

    cs.CR 2025-07 reject novelty 5.0 of 10

    Steganographic prompt injection is reported to covertly manipulate vision-language models with up to 31.8% success, but the evidence is not reproducible.

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