Actions Speak What You Want: Provably Sample-Efficient Reinforcement Learning of the Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium from Strategic Feedbacks

We study reinforcement learning (RL) for learning a Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium (QSE) in an episodic Markov game with a leader-follower structure. In specific, at the outset of the game, the leader announces her policy to the follower and commits to it. The follower observes the leader's policy and, in turn, adopts a quantal response policy by solving an entropy-regularized policy optimization problem induced by leader's policy. The goal of the leader is to find her optimal policy, which yields the optimal expected total return, by interacting with the follower and learning from data. A key challenge of this problem is that the leader cannot observe the follower's reward, and needs to infer the follower's quantal response model from his actions against leader's policies. We propose sample-efficient algorithms for both the online and offline settings, in the context of function approximation. Our algorithms are based on (i) learning the quantal response model via maximum likelihood estimation and (ii) model-free or model-based RL for solving the leader's decision making problem, and we show that they achieve sublinear regret upper bounds. Moreover, we quantify the uncertainty of these estimators and leverage the uncertainty to implement optimistic and pessimistic algorithms for online and offline settings. Besides, when specialized to the linear and myopic setting, our algorithms are also computationally efficient. Our theoretical analysis features a novel performance-difference lemma which incorporates the error of quantal response model, which might be of independent interest.