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PAPILLON: Efficient and Stealthy Fuzz Testing-Powered Jailbreaks for LLMs

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arxiv 2409.14866 v5 pith:RWSO6TEH submitted 2024-09-23 cs.CR cs.AI

classification cs.CRcs.AI
keywords papillonattackjailbreakingpromptsadditionallyjailbreakllmstemplates
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Large Language Models (LLMs) have excelled in various tasks but are still vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks, where attackers create jailbreak prompts to mislead the model to produce harmful or offensive content. Current jailbreak methods either rely heavily on manually crafted templates, which pose challenges in scalability and adaptability, or struggle to generate semantically coherent prompts, making them easy to detect. Additionally, most existing approaches involve lengthy prompts, leading to higher query costs. In this paper, to remedy these challenges, we introduce a novel jailbreaking attack framework called PAPILLON, which is an automated, black-box jailbreaking attack framework that adapts the black-box fuzz testing approach with a series of customized designs. Instead of relying on manually crafted templates,PAPILLON starts with an empty seed pool, removing the need to search for any related jailbreaking templates. We also develop three novel question-dependent mutation strategies using an LLM helper to generate prompts that maintain semantic coherence while significantly reducing their length. Additionally, we implement a two-level judge module to accurately detect genuine successful jailbreaks. We evaluated PAPILLON on 7 representative LLMs and compared it with 5 state-of-the-art jailbreaking attack strategies. For proprietary LLM APIs, such as GPT-3.5 turbo, GPT-4, and Gemini-Pro, PAPILLONs achieves attack success rates of over 90%, 80%, and 74%, respectively, exceeding existing baselines by more than 60\%. Additionally, PAPILLON can maintain high semantic coherence while significantly reducing the length of jailbreak prompts. When targeting GPT-4, PAPILLON can achieve over 78% attack success rate even with 100 tokens. Moreover, PAPILLON demonstrates transferability and is robust to state-of-the-art defenses. Code: https://github.com/aaFrostnova/Papillon

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. External Data Extraction Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Large Language Models

    cs.CR 2025-10 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    SECRET, an adaptive RAG extraction attack that fuses LLM-optimized jailbreak prompts with cluster-guided queries, extracts large portions of private databases from commercial and open LLMs, including ~35% of a sampled...

  2. LLM in the Middle: A Systematic Review of Threats and Mitigations to Real-World LLM-based Systems

    cs.CR 2025-09 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A systematic review that categorizes LLM threats, severity scores, and mitigations across development and operation life cycles and multiple deployment scenarios.

  3. Stateful Cooperative Agents Safeguarding LLMs Against Evolving Multi-Turn Attacks

    cs.CR 2026-07 reject novelty 4.0 of 10

    CoopGuard's defer-tempt-analyze-coordinate agents cut reported jailbreak success and raise attacker token costs on the new EMRA benchmark, but the deceptive-rate metric is partly defined by the paper's own scoring rubric.

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