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Attack Atlas: A Practitioner's Perspective on Challenges and Pitfalls in Red Teaming GenAI
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As generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs), become increasingly integrated into production applications, new attack surfaces and vulnerabilities emerge and put a focus on adversarial threats in natural language and multi-modal systems. Red-teaming has gained importance in proactively identifying weaknesses in these systems, while blue-teaming works to protect against such adversarial attacks. Despite growing academic interest in adversarial risks for generative AI, there is limited guidance tailored for practitioners to assess and mitigate these challenges in real-world environments. To address this, our contributions include: (1) a practical examination of red- and blue-teaming strategies for securing generative AI, (2) identification of key challenges and open questions in defense development and evaluation, and (3) the Attack Atlas, an intuitive framework that brings a practical approach to analyzing single-turn input attacks, placing it at the forefront for practitioners. This work aims to bridge the gap between academic insights and practical security measures for the protection of generative AI systems.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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From Seed to Harvest: Augmenting Human Creativity with AI for Red-teaming Text-to-Image Models
Seed2Harvest expands 1,000 human adversarial prompts into 27,650 LLM-generated variants that keep roughly comparable unsafe-image trigger rates and add hundreds of new geographic contexts.
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SecurityLingua: Efficient Defense of LLM Jailbreak Attacks via Security-Aware Prompt Compression
A security-aware prompt compressor that reveals the hidden intent of jailbreak prompts and injects it into the system prompt reduces average attack success from 35% to 1% with negligible overhead.
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