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Breaking ReAct Agents: Foot-in-the-Door Attack Will Get You In

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arxiv 2410.16950 v1 pith:V7IQLTLP submitted 2024-10-22 cs.CR cs.AI

classification cs.CRcs.AI
keywords agentsactionsagentfoot-in-the-doorreactattackattacksbecome
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

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Forward citations

Cited by 4 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. FORGE: Research-Trajectory Hijacking Attacks on Deep Research Agents

    cs.AI 2026-07 conditional novelty 6.5 of 10

    FORGE poisons deep-research planning with coordinated fake reasoning documents, reaching 26.4% PRISM report contamination at five injections; Root Query Anchoring halves that severity.

  2. Context manipulation attacks : Web agents are susceptible to corrupted memory

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Web agents with protected prompts can still be hijacked by injecting malicious steps into their stored task plans, reaching up to 63% success on privacy leaks.

  3. A Survey on Autonomy-Induced Security Risks in Large Model-Based Agents

    cs.AI 2025-06 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    The paper surveys security risks of LLM agents, organizes them into a five-level autonomy taxonomy, and proposes an untested CMDP-based architecture called R2A2.

  4. A Red Teaming Roadmap Towards System-Level Safety

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A position paper from Scale AI argues that red teaming research should prioritize product-level safety specifications, realistic attacker models, and system-level monitoring over abstract model-level harm benchmarks.

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