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Dynamic pricing under nested logit demand

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arxiv 2101.04486 v1 pith:VBGWRKW3 submitted 2021-01-12 math.OC econ.TH

classification math.OCecon.TH
keywords pricingdemandonlineconsumerscostsdynamicexpectedfrac
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abstract

Recently, there is growing interest and need for dynamic pricing algorithms, especially, in the field of online marketplaces by offering smart pricing options for big online stores. We present an approach to adjust prices based on the observed online market data. The key idea is to characterize optimal prices as minimizers of a total expected revenue function, which turns out to be convex. We assume that consumers face information processing costs, hence, follow a discrete choice demand model, and suppliers are equipped with quantity adjustment costs. We prove the strong smoothness of the total expected revenue function by deriving the strong convexity modulus of its dual. Our gradient-based pricing schemes outbalance supply and demand at the convergence rates of $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{t})$ and $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{t^2})$, respectively. This suggests that the imperfect behavior of consumers and suppliers helps to stabilize the market.

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  1. Airdrop Games

    cs.GT 2025-05 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    For threshold technologies, an airdrop fraction above rho_c = alpha*n*tau/(V_high - V_low) makes the successful-participation equilibrium selected almost surely under low-noise logit dynamics.

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