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GAVEL: Towards Rule-Based Safety Through Activation Monitoring

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abstract

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly paired with activation-based monitoring to detect and prevent harmful behaviors that may not be apparent at the surface-text level. However, existing activation safety approaches, trained on broad misuse datasets, struggle with poor precision, limited flexibility, and lack of interpretability. This paper introduces a new paradigm: rule-based activation safety, inspired by rule-sharing practices in cybersecurity. We propose modeling activations as cognitive elements (CEs), fine-grained, interpretable factors such as 'making a threat' and 'payment processing', that can be composed to capture nuanced, domain-specific behaviors with higher precision. Building on this representation, we present a practical framework that defines predicate rules over CEs and detects violations in real time. This enables practitioners to configure and update safeguards without retraining models or detectors, while supporting transparency and auditability. Our results show that compositional rule-based activation safety improves precision, supports domain customization, and lays the groundwork for scalable, interpretable, and auditable AI governance. We open source GAVEL and introduce GAVEL Studio, an interactive rule authoring and management tool. Code and datasets are available at github.com/Offensive-AI-Lab/gavel.

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cs.LG 1

years

2026 1

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UNVERDICTED 1

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Same Payload, Different Channel: Measuring Trust Asymmetry in Tool-Using Language Models

cs.LG · 2026-05-30 · unverdicted · novelty 7.0

Agent-native LLMs are substantially more vulnerable to adversarial instructions arriving in tool descriptions than user messages (with the pattern reversing for general-purpose models and inverting again for tool outputs), as quantified by the new Safety Asymmetry Score across six models and three a

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  • Same Payload, Different Channel: Measuring Trust Asymmetry in Tool-Using Language Models cs.LG · 2026-05-30 · unverdicted · none · ref 20 · internal anchor

    Agent-native LLMs are substantially more vulnerable to adversarial instructions arriving in tool descriptions than user messages (with the pattern reversing for general-purpose models and inverting again for tool outputs), as quantified by the new Safety Asymmetry Score across six models and three a