Optimal mechanisms for procuring hard computational work in adversarial blockchains incur loss scaling logarithmically with liveness-fault cost, with equilibria that designate one random primary worker and a committee fallback.
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2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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2026 2verdicts
UNVERDICTED 2representative citing papers
Agent-to-agent finance is framed as the machine-mediated financial layer where autonomous agents use programmable settlement, smart wallets, and decentralized registries to transact while maintaining verifiability.
citing papers explorer
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Adversarial procurement in blockchains
Optimal mechanisms for procuring hard computational work in adversarial blockchains incur loss scaling logarithmically with liveness-fault cost, with equilibria that designate one random primary worker and a committee fallback.
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Agent-to-Agent Finance: Blockchain Payments and Trust Infrastructure for Autonomous AI Agents
Agent-to-agent finance is framed as the machine-mediated financial layer where autonomous agents use programmable settlement, smart wallets, and decentralized registries to transact while maintaining verifiability.