Principal-agent adverse selection with unique contracts is reformulated as a stochastic target problem for the agent and a stochastic optimal control problem for the principal.
Dynamic trading with predictable returns and transaction costs.Journal of Finance, 68(6):2309–2340
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Pith papers citing it
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2026 2verdicts
UNVERDICTED 2representative citing papers
This work derives risk-constrained static and asymmetric dynamic collateral control rules for DeFi spot-perpetual basis trading, validated via Monte Carlo simulations and historical backtests showing dependence on funding environments.
citing papers explorer
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Principal-agent problems with adverse selection: A stochastic target problem formulation
Principal-agent adverse selection with unique contracts is reformulated as a stochastic target problem for the agent and a stochastic optimal control problem for the principal.
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Dynamic Collateral Control for Permissionless Spot Perpetual Basis Trading
This work derives risk-constrained static and asymmetric dynamic collateral control rules for DeFi spot-perpetual basis trading, validated via Monte Carlo simulations and historical backtests showing dependence on funding environments.