Introduces neighbourhood balancing games on weighted graphs as generalizations of Wardrop and congestion games and studies equilibria existence and efficiency.
How bad is selfish routing? Journal of the ACM (JACM)
4 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Pith papers citing it
verdicts
UNVERDICTED 4representative citing papers
In non-modular polymatroidal service markets, revenue-optimal DSIC mechanisms cannot also be credible for strategic operators, with tight welfare-loss bounds on the Cost of Non-Credibility across network topologies.
Non-profit utilities suffer up to 2x overconsumption from uncoordinated users; incentive mechanisms can mitigate this while preserving privacy and satisfying budget balance or deficit.
Multi-agent DRL framework shows dynamic incentives and pricing can cut commuter costs ~20%, emissions ~10%, and double public transport profit in simulated morning peak scenarios.
citing papers explorer
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Credibility Trilemma in Polymatroidal Service Markets
In non-modular polymatroidal service markets, revenue-optimal DSIC mechanisms cannot also be credible for strategic operators, with tight welfare-loss bounds on the Cost of Non-Credibility across network topologies.
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Incentive Mechanisms to Prevent Efficiency Loss of Non-Profit Utilities
Non-profit utilities suffer up to 2x overconsumption from uncoordinated users; incentive mechanisms can mitigate this while preserving privacy and satisfying budget balance or deficit.