SAAM: Stealthy Adversarial Attack on Monocular Depth Estimation
Reviewed by Pith T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 kernel pith:6WDFINDErecord.jsonopen to challenge →
read the original abstract
In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of MDE to adversarial patches. We propose a novel \underline{S}tealthy \underline{A}dversarial \underline{A}ttacks on \underline{M}DE (SAAM) that compromises MDE by either corrupting the estimated distance or causing an object to seamlessly blend into its surroundings. Our experiments, demonstrate that the designed stealthy patch successfully causes a DNN-based MDE to misestimate the depth of objects. In fact, our proposed adversarial patch achieves a significant 60\% depth error with 99\% ratio of the affected region. Importantly, despite its adversarial nature, the patch maintains a naturalistic appearance, making it inconspicuous to human observers. We believe that this work sheds light on the threat of adversarial attacks in the context of MDE on edge devices. We hope it raises awareness within the community about the potential real-life harm of such attacks and encourages further research into developing more robust and adaptive defense mechanisms.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet.
discussion (0)
Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.