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arxiv: 2503.05445 · v3 · pith:W3CIG53N · submitted 2025-03-07 · cs.CR · cs.DB

Are Your LLM-based Text-to-SQL Models Secure? Exploring SQL Injection via Backdoor Attacks

Reviewed by Pith T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 kernel pith:W3CIG53Nrecord.jsonopen to challenge →

classification cs.CR cs.DB
keywords backdoormodelstext-to-sqllanguagemalicioussecurityattackattacks
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Large language models (LLMs) have shown state-of-the-art results in translating natural language questions into SQL queries (Text-to-SQL), a long-standing challenge within the database community. However, security concerns remain largely unexplored, particularly the threat of backdoor attacks, which can introduce malicious behaviors into models through fine-tuning with poisoned datasets. In this work, we systematically investigate the vulnerabilities of LLM-based Text-to-SQL models and present ToxicSQL, a novel backdoor attack framework. Our approach leverages stealthy {semantic and character-level triggers} to make backdoors difficult to detect and remove, ensuring that malicious behaviors remain covert while maintaining high model accuracy on benign inputs. Furthermore, we propose leveraging SQL injection payloads as backdoor targets, enabling the generation of malicious yet executable SQL queries, which pose severe security and privacy risks in language model-based SQL development. We demonstrate that injecting only 0.44% of poisoned data can result in an attack success rate of 79.41%, posing a significant risk to database security. Additionally, we propose detection and mitigation strategies to enhance model reliability. Our findings highlight the urgent need for security-aware Text-to-SQL development, emphasizing the importance of robust defenses against backdoor threats.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

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  1. Agents That Know Too Much: A Data-Centric Survey of Privacy in LLM Agents

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