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Certified Control: An Architecture for Verifiable Safety of Autonomous Vehicles
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Widespread adoption of autonomous cars will require greater confidence in their safety than is currently possible. Certified control is a new safety architecture whose goal is two-fold: to achieve a very high level of safety, and to provide a framework for justifiable confidence in that safety. The key idea is a runtime monitor that acts, along with sensor hardware and low-level control and actuators, as a small trusted base, ensuring the safety of the system as a whole. Unfortunately, in current systems complex perception makes the verification even of a runtime monitor challenging. Unlike traditional runtime monitoring, therefore, a certified control monitor does not perform perception and analysis itself. Instead, the main controller assembles evidence that the proposed action is safe into a certificate that is then checked independently by the monitor. This exploits the classic gap between the costs of finding and checking. The controller is assigned the task of finding the certificate, and can thus use the most sophisticated algorithms available (including learning-enabled software); the monitor is assigned only the task of checking, and can thus run quickly and be smaller and formally verifiable. This paper explains the key ideas of certified control and illustrates them with a certificate for LiDAR data and its formal verification. It shows how the architecture dramatically reduces the amount of code to be verified, providing an end-to-end safety analysis that would likely not be achievable in a traditional architecture.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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The Impact of Operational-Data Fidelity when Assessing Safety-Critical Autonomous-Vehicle Software
Coarse failure data without false-positive vs false-negative labels can make conservative Bayesian reliability claims for AV software dangerously optimistic, sometimes infinitely so after a single failure.
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Using Formal Models, Safety Shields and Certified Control to Validate AI-Based Train Systems
A demonstrator couples a formal B model, a real YOLO perception AI, and a certified-control checker to enable runtime monitoring and Monte Carlo safety validation of an AI-based train system.
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