Pith. sign in

REVIEW 2 cited by

A Survey of Recent Backdoor Attacks and Defenses in Large Language Models

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2406.06852 v5 pith:DX7LCQUN submitted 2024-06-10 cs.CR cs.AIcs.CL

classification cs.CRcs.AIcs.CL
keywords attacksbackdoorlanguagefine-tuningmodelsllmsalgorithmsattack
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs), which bridge the gap between human language understanding and complex problem-solving, achieve state-of-the-art performance on several NLP tasks, particularly in few-shot and zero-shot settings. Despite the demonstrable efficacy of LLMs, due to constraints on computational resources, users have to engage with open-source language models or outsource the entire training process to third-party platforms. However, research has demonstrated that language models are susceptible to potential security vulnerabilities, particularly in backdoor attacks. Backdoor attacks are designed to introduce targeted vulnerabilities into language models by poisoning training samples or model weights, allowing attackers to manipulate model responses through malicious triggers. While existing surveys on backdoor attacks provide a comprehensive overview, they lack an in-depth examination of backdoor attacks specifically targeting LLMs. To bridge this gap and grasp the latest trends in the field, this paper presents a novel perspective on backdoor attacks for LLMs by focusing on fine-tuning methods. Specifically, we systematically classify backdoor attacks into three categories: full-parameter fine-tuning, parameter-efficient fine-tuning, and no fine-tuning Based on insights from a substantial review, we also discuss crucial issues for future research on backdoor attacks, such as further exploring attack algorithms that do not require fine-tuning, or developing more covert attack algorithms.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Model Tampering Attacks Enable More Rigorous Evaluations of LLM Capabilities

    cs.CR 2025-02 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Model tampering attacks, especially few-shot fine-tuning, reliably re-elicit unlearned capabilities in Llama-3-8B and can bound the success of held-out input-space attacks.

  2. MEraser: An Effective Fingerprint Erasure Approach for Large Language Models

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    By fine-tuning on mismatched pairs and then clean pairs, MEraser drops fingerprint success rate to zero on three backdoor-based fingerprinting schemes across multiple LLMs, with a reusable LoRA adapter for transfer.

Pith tools