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SENTAUR: Security EnhaNced Trojan Assessment Using LLMs Against Undesirable Revisions

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arxiv 2407.12352 v1 pith:BU2727FA submitted 2024-07-17 cs.CR cs.AIcs.AR

classification cs.CRcs.AIcs.AR
keywords sentaurlearningmodelassessmentbenchmarksdescriptionsdesignevaluation
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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A globally distributed IC supply chain brings risks due to untrusted third parties. The risks span inadvertent use of hardware Trojan (HT), inserted Intellectual Property (3P-IP) or Electronic Design Automation (EDA) flows. HT can introduce stealthy HT behavior, prevent an IC work as intended, or leak sensitive data via side channels. To counter HTs, rapidly examining HT scenarios is a key requirement. While Trust-Hub benchmarks are a good starting point to assess defenses, they encompass a small subset of manually created HTs within the expanse of HT designs. Further, the HTs may disappear during synthesis. We propose a large language model (LLM) framework SENTAUR to generate a suite of legitimate HTs for a Register Transfer Level (RTL) design by learning its specifications, descriptions, and natural language descriptions of HT effects. Existing tools and benchmarks are limited; they need a learning period to construct an ML model to mimic the threat model and are difficult to reproduce. SENTAUR can swiftly produce HT instances by leveraging LLMs without any learning period and sanitizing the HTs facilitating their rapid assessment. Evaluation of SENTAUR involved generating effective, synthesizable, and practical HTs from TrustHub and elsewhere, investigating impacts of payloads/triggers at the RTL. While our evaluation focused on HT insertion, SENTAUR can generalize to automatically transform an RTL code to have defined functional modifications.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. TrojanGYM: A Detector-in-the-Loop LLM for Adaptive RTL Hardware Trojan Insertion

    cs.CR 2026-01 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    TrojanGYM couples LLM-driven RTL Trojan insertion with GNN detector feedback, producing evasive Trojans (up to 83.33% evasion under best-LLM oracle selection).

  2. Translating Common Security Assertions Across Processor Designs: A RISC-V Case Study

    cs.CR 2025-02 reject novelty 4.0 of 10

    A RISC-V assertion translation workflow is reported with 100% translation and Trojan detection, but the detection test is circular because the Trojans were invented from the assertions themselves.

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